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#### Interpretation: Topical affirmatives must instrumentally defend n expansion of the scope of the United States core antitrust laws to substantially increase prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices.

#### Resolved means a policy

Louisiana House 5

(<http://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htm>)

Resolution A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4)

#### Federal government is the legislative, executive and judicial

US Legal No Date (United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/)

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

#### ‘Its’ means cooperation must be governmental

US District Court 7 (United States District Court for the District of the Virgin Islands, Division of St. Thomas and St. John, “AGF Marine Aviation & Transp. v. Cassin,” *2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90808*, Lexis)

The Court inadvertently used the word "his" when the Court intended to use the word "its." The possessive pronoun was intended to refer to the party preceding its use--AGF. Indeed, that reference is consistent with the undisputed facts in this case, which indicate that Cassin completed an application for the insurance policy and submitted it to his agent, Theodore Tunick & Company ("Tunick"). Tunick, in turn, submitted the application to AGF's underwriting agent, TL Dallas. (See Pl.'s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 5.)

#### The “core” antitrust statutes are the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and FTC Act

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U.S. antitrust law is defined by federal and state statutes, as interpreted by the courts. The core federal statutes are the Sherman Act,1 passed by Congress in 1890, and the Federal Trade Commission2 and Clayton Acts,3 both passed in 1914. The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) (together the “agencies”) share enforcement of most areas of federal antitrust law but with some differences in the scope of their authority. The FTC has sole authority to enforce Section 5 of FTC Act, which prohibits (1) unfair methods of competition and (2) unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The FTC almost always pursues claims for anticompetitive conduct as unfair methods of competition and reserves charges of unfair or deceptive acts or practices for consumer protection violations. Though the FTC's authority to challenge unfair methods of competition goes beyond conduct prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in practice the FTC brings most unfair methods of competition cases under the same standards that courts apply to Sherman Act claims. The most prominent exception is the invitation to collude offense, which falls outside the scope of the Sherman Act (if the invitation is not accepted, there is no agreement). The FTC challenges invitations to collude as so-called “standalone” violations of Section 5.4 The DOJ has sole authority to pursue criminal violations of the antitrust laws. Most states have their own state antitrust and unfair competition statutes. State law follows federal law to some extent, though as discussed below, may differ from federal law in meaningful ways that vary state to state. State attorneys general and private parties can also typically file suit to enforce both federal and state antitrust law.

#### Two standards

#### Predictable Limits—a bounded topic serves as a predictable stasis point for debate that guarantees thematic coherence there are a infinite amount of affs under their interp, making the neg prepare for them is impossible and favors the aff because they get leverage unpredictable offense—absent defined limits, debate’s competitive incentives create a race to the margins that distorts topic research and kills clash.

#### Putting our positions up for debate and studying their flaws best breaks down our neural bias towards intellectual arrogance, and fosters a culture of better scholarship---our brains are terrible at knowing when we’re wrong and updating our beliefs. The impact is intellectual humility---rewards bluster instead of thoroughness that trends us and society towards extreme, unvetted positions where we criticize without accepting criticism

Resnick 19 [Brian Resnick is a science reporter at Vox.com, covering social and behavioral sciences, space, medicine, the environment, and anything that makes you think "whoa that's cool." Before Vox, he was a staff correspondent at National Journal where he wrote two cover stories for the (now defunct) weekly print magazine, and reported on breaking news and politics. Intellectual humility: the importance of knowing you might be wrong. January 4, 2019. <https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2019/1/4/17989224/intellectual-humility-explained-psychology-replication>] //~~rhetoric~~ [modified]

I’ve come to appreciate what a crucial tool it is for learning, especially in an increasingly interconnected and complicated world. As technology makes it easier to lie and spread false information incredibly quickly, we need intellectually humble, curious people.

I’ve also realized how difficult it is to foster intellectual humility. In my reporting on this, I’ve learned there are three main challenges on the path to humility:

1. In order for us to acquire more intellectual humility, we all, even the smartest among us, need to better appreciate our cognitive ~~blind spots~~. [oversights] Our minds are more imperfect and imprecise than we’d often like to admit. Our ignorance can be invisible.

2. Even when we overcome that immense challenge and figure out our errors, we need to remember we won’t necessarily be punished for saying, “I was wrong.” And we need to be braver about saying it. We need a culture that celebrates those words.

3. We’ll never achieve perfect intellectual humility. So we need to choose our convictions thoughtfully.

This is all to say: Intellectual humility isn’t easy. But damn, it’s a virtue worth striving for, and failing for, in this new year.

Intellectual humility, explained

Intellectual humility is simply “the recognition that the things you believe in might in fact be wrong,” as Mark Leary, a social and personality psychologist at Duke University, tells me.

But don’t confuse it with overall humility or bashfulness. It’s not about being a pushover; it’s not about lacking confidence, or self-esteem. The intellectually humble don’t cave every time their thoughts are challenged.

Instead, it’s a method of thinking. It’s about entertaining the possibility that you may be wrong and being open to learning from the experience of others. Intellectual humility is about being actively curious about your blind spots. One illustration is in the ideal of the scientific method, where a scientist actively works against her own hypothesis, attempting to rule out any other alternative explanations for a phenomenon before settling on a conclusion. It’s about asking: What am I missing here?

It doesn’t require a high IQ or a particular skill set. It does, however, require making a habit of thinking about your limits, which can be painful. “It’s a process of monitoring your own confidence,” Leary says.

This idea is older than social psychology. Philosophers from the earliest days have grappled with the limits of human knowledge. Michel de Montaigne, the 16th-century French philosopher credited with inventing the essay, wrote that “the plague of man is boasting of his knowledge.”

Social psychologists have learned that humility is associated with other valuable character traits: People who score higher on intellectual humility questionnaires are more open to hearing opposing views. They more readily seek out information that conflicts with their worldview. They pay more attention to evidence and have a stronger self-awareness when they answer a question incorrectly.

When you ask the intellectually arrogant if they’ve heard of bogus historical events like “Hamrick’s Rebellion,” they’ll say, “Sure.” The intellectually humble are less likely to do so. Studies have found that cognitive reflection — i.e., analytic thinking — is correlated with being better able to discern fake news stories from real ones. These studies haven’t looked at intellectual humility per se, but it’s plausible there’s an overlap.

Most important of all, the intellectually humble are more likely to admit it when they are wrong. When we admit we’re wrong, we can grow closer to the truth.

One reason I’ve been thinking about the virtue of humility recently is because our president, Donald Trump, is one of the least humble people on the planet.

It was Trump who said on the night of his nomination, “I alone can fix it,” with the “it” being our entire political system. It was Trump who once said, “I have one of the great memories of all time.” More recently, Trump told the Associated Press, “I have a natural instinct for science,” in dodging a question on climate change.

A frustration I feel about Trump and the era of history he represents is that his pride and his success — he is among the most powerful people on earth — seem to be related. He exemplifies how our society rewards confidence and bluster, not truthfulness.

Yet we’ve also seen some very high-profile examples lately of how overconfident leadership can be ruinous for companies. Look at what happened to Theranos, a company that promised to change the way blood samples are drawn. It was all hype, all bluster, and it collapsed. Or consider Enron’s overconfident executives, who were often hailed for their intellectual brilliance — they ran the company into the ground with risky, suspect financial decisions.

The problem with arrogance is that the truth always catches up. Trump may be president and confident in his denials of climate change, but the changes to our environment will still ruin so many things in the future.

Why it’s so hard to see our blind spots: “Our ignorance is invisible to us”

As I’ve been reading the psychological research on intellectual humility and the character traits it correlates with, I can’t help but fume: Why can’t more people be like this?

We need more intellectual humility for two reasons. One is that our culture promotes and rewards overconfidence and arrogance (think Trump and Theranos, or the advice your career counselor gave you when going into job interviews). At the same time, when we are wrong — out of ignorance or error — and realize it, our culture doesn’t make it easy to admit it. Humbling moments too easily can turn into moments of humiliation.

So how can we promote intellectual humility for both of these conditions?

In asking that question of researchers and scholars, I’ve learned to appreciate how hard a challenge it is to foster intellectual humility.

First off, I think it’s helpful to remember how flawed the human brain can be and how prone we all are to intellectual blind spots. When you learn about how the brain actually works, how it actually perceives the world, it’s hard not to be a bit horrified, and a bit humbled.

We often can’t see — or even sense — what we don’t know. It helps to realize that it’s normal and human to be wrong.

It’s rare that a viral meme also provides a surprisingly deep lesson on the imperfect nature of the human mind. But believe it or not, the great “Yanny or Laurel” debate of 2018 fits the bill.

For the very few of you who didn’t catch it — I hope you’re recovering nicely from that coma — here’s what happened.

An audio clip (you can hear it below) says the name “Laurel” in a robotic voice. Or does it? Some people hear the clip and immediately hear “Yanny.” And both sets of people — Team Yanny and Team Laurel — are indeed hearing the same thing.

Hearing, the perception of sound, ought to be a simple thing for our brains to do. That so many people can listen to the same clip and hear such different things should give us humbling pause. Hearing “Yanny” or “Laurel” in any given moment ultimately depends on a whole host of factors: the quality of the speakers you’re using, whether you have hearing loss, your expectations.

Here’s the deep lesson to draw from all of this: Much as we might tell ourselves our experience of the world is the truth, our reality will always be an interpretation. Light enters our eyes, sound waves enter our ears, chemicals waft into our noses, and it’s up to our brains to make a guess about what it all is.

Perceptual tricks like this (“the dress” is another one) reveal that our perceptions are not the absolute truth, that the physical phenomena of the universe are indifferent to whether our feeble sensory organs can perceive them correctly. We’re just guessing. Yet these phenomena leave us indignant: How could it be that our perception of the world isn’t the only one?

That sense of indignation is called naive realism: the feeling that our perception of the world is the truth. “I think we sometimes confuse effortlessness with accuracy,” Chris Chabris, a psychological researcher who co-authored a book on the challenges of human perception, tells me. When something is so immediate and effortless to us — hearing the sound of “Yanny” — it just feels true. (Similarly, psychologists find when a lie is repeated, it’s more likely to be misremembered as being true, and for a similar reason: When you’re hearing something for the second or third time, your brain becomes faster to respond to it. And that fluency is confused with truth.)

Our interpretations of reality are often arbitrary, but we’re still stubborn about them. Nonetheless, the same observations can lead to wildly different conclusions.

(Here’s that same sentence in GIF form.)

For every sense and every component of human judgment, there are illusions and ambiguities we interpret arbitrarily.

Some are gravely serious. White people often perceive black men to be bigger, taller, and more muscular (and therefore more threatening) than they really are. That’s racial bias — but it’s also a socially constructed illusion. When we’re taught or learn to fear other people, our brains distort their potential threat. They seem more menacing, and we want to build walls around them. When we learn or are taught that other people are less than human, we’re less likely to look upon them kindly and more likely to be okay when violence is committed against them.

Not only are our interpretations of the world often arbitrary, but we’re often overconfident in them. “Our ignorance is invisible to us,” David Dunning, an expert on human blind spots, says.

You might recognize his name as half of the psychological phenomenon that bears his name: the Dunning-Kruger effect. That’s where people of low ability — let’s say, those who fail to understand logic puzzles — tend to unduly overestimate their abilities. Inexperience masquerades as expertise.

An irony of the Dunning-Kruger effect is that so many people misinterpret it, are overconfident in their understanding of it, and get it wrong.

When people talk or write about the Dunning-Kruger effect, it’s almost always in reference to other people. “The fact is this is a phenomenon that visits all of us sooner or later,” Dunning says. We’re all overconfident in our ignorance from time to time. (Perhaps related: Some 65 percent of Americans believe they’re more intelligent than average, which is wishful thinking.)

Similarly, we’re overconfident in our ability to remember. Human memory is extremely malleable, prone to small changes. When we remember, we don’t wind back our minds to a certain time and relive that exact moment, yet many of us think our memories work like a videotape.

Dunning hopes his work helps people understand that “not knowing the scope of your own ignorance is part of the human condition,” he says. “But the problem with it is we see it in other people, and we don’t see it in ourselves. The first rule of the Dunning-Kruger club is you don’t know you’re a member of the Dunning-Kruger club.”

People are unlikely to judge you harshly for admitting you’re wrong

In 2012, psychologist Will Gervais scored an honor any PhD science student would covet: a co-authored paper in the journal Science, one of the top interdisciplinary scientific journals in the world. Publishing in Science doesn’t just help a researcher rise up in academic circles; it often gets them a lot of media attention too.

One of the experiments in the paper tried to see if getting people to think more rationally would make them less willing to report religious beliefs. They had people look at a picture of Rodin’s The Thinker or another statue. They thought The Thinker would nudge people to think harder, more analytically. In this more rational frame of mind, then, the participants would be less likely to endorse believing in something as faith-based and invisible as religion, and that’s what the study found. It was catnip for science journalists: one small trick to change the way we think.

But it was a tiny, small-sample study, the exact type that is prone to yielding false positives. Several years later, another lab attempted to replicate the findings with a much larger sample size, and failed to find any evidence for the effect.

And while Gervais knew that the original study wasn’t rigorous, he couldn’t help but feel a twinge of discomfort.

“Intellectually, I could say the original data weren’t strong,” he says. “That’s very different from the human, personal reaction to it. Which is like, ‘Oh, shit, there’s going to be a published failure to replicate my most cited finding that’s gotten the most media attention.’ You start worrying about stuff like, ‘Are there going to be career repercussions? Are people going to think less of my other work and stuff I’ve done?’”

Gervais’s story is familiar: Many of us fear we’ll be seen as less competent, less trustworthy, if we admit wrongness. Even when we can see our own errors — which, as outlined above, is not easy to do — we’re hesitant to admit it.

But turns out this assumption is false. As Adam Fetterman, a social psychologist at the University of Texas El Paso, has found in a few studies, wrongness admission isn’t usually judged harshly. “When we do see someone admit that they are wrong, the wrongness admitter is seen as more communal, more friendly,” he says. It’s almost never the case, in his studies, “that when you admit you’re wrong, people think you are less competent.”

Sure, there might be some people who will troll you for your mistakes. There might be a mob on Twitter that converges in order to shame you. Some moments of humility could be humiliating. But this fear must be vanquished if we are to become less intellectually arrogant and more intellectually humble.

Humility can’t just come from within — we need environments where it can thrive

But even if you’re motivated to be more intellectually humble, our culture doesn’t always reward it.

The field of psychology, overall, has been reckoning with a “replication crisis” where many classic findings in the science don’t hold up under rigorous scrutiny. Incredibly influential textbook findings in psychology — like the “ego depletion” theory of willpower or the “marshmallow test” — have been bending or breaking.

I’ve found it fascinating to watch the field of psychology deal with this. For some researchers, the reckoning has been personally unsettling. “I’m in a dark place,” Michael Inzlicht, a University of Toronto psychologist, wrote in a 2016 blog post after seeing the theory of ego depletion crumble before his eyes. “Have I been chasing puffs of smoke for all these years?”

What I’ve learned from reporting on the “replication crisis” is that intellectual humility requires support from peers and institutions. And that environment is hard to build.

“What we teach undergrads is that scientists want to prove themselves wrong,” says Simine Vazire, a psychologist and journal editor who often writes and speaks about replication issues. “But, ‘How would I know if I was wrong?’ is actually a really, really hard question to answer. It involves things like having critics yell at you and telling you that you did things wrong and reanalyze your data.”

And that’s not fun. Again: Even among scientists — people who ought to question everything — intellectual humility is hard. In some cases, researchers have refused to concede their original conclusions despite the unveiling of new evidence. (One famous psychologist under fire recently told me angrily, “I will stand by that conclusion for the rest of my life, no matter what anyone says.”)

Psychologists are human. When they reach a conclusion, it becomes hard to see things another way. Plus, the incentives for a successful career in science push researchers to publish as many positive findings as possible.

There are two solutions — among many — to make psychological science more humble, and I think we can learn from them.

One is that humility needs to be built into the standard practices of the science. And that happens through transparency. It’s becoming more commonplace for scientists to preregister — i.e., commit to — a study design before even embarking on an experiment. That way, it’s harder for them to deviate from the plan and cherry-pick results. It also makes sure all data is open and accessible to anyone who wants to conduct a reanalysis.

That “sort of builds humility into the structure of the scientific enterprise,” Chabris says. “We’re not all-knowing and all-seeing and perfect at our jobs, so we put [the data] out there for other people to check out, to improve upon it, come up with new ideas from and so on.” To be more intellectually humble, we need to be more transparent about our knowledge. We need to show others what we know and what we don’t.

And two, there needs to be more celebration of failure, and a culture that accepts it. That includes building safe places for people to admit they were wrong, like the Loss of Confidence Project.

But it’s clear this cultural change won’t come easily.

“In the end,” Rohrer says, after getting a lot of positive feedback on the project, “we ended up with just a handful of statements.”

We need a balance between convictions and humility

There’s a personal cost to an intellectually humble outlook. For me, at least, it’s anxiety.

When I open myself up to the vastness of my own ignorance, I can’t help but feel a sudden suffocating feeling. I have just one small mind, a tiny, leaky boat upon which to go exploring knowledge in a vast and knotty sea of which I carry no clear map.

Why is it that some people never seem to wrestle with those waters? That they stand on the shore, squint their eyes, and transform that sea into a puddle in their minds and then get awarded for their false certainty? “I don’t know if I can tell you that humility will get you farther than arrogance,” says Tenelle Porter, a University of California Davis psychologist who has studied intellectual humility.

Of course, following humility to an extreme end isn’t enough. You don’t need to be humble about your belief that the world is round. I just think more humility, sprinkled here and there, would be quite nice.

“It’s bad to think of problems like this like a Rubik’s cube: a puzzle that has a neat and satisfying solution that you can put on your desk,” says Michael Lynch, a University of Connecticut philosophy professor. Instead, it’s a problem “you can make progress at a moment in time, and make things better. And that we can do — that we can definitely do.”

For a democracy to flourish, Lynch argues, we need a balance between convictions — our firmly held beliefs — and humility. We need convictions, because “an apathetic electorate is no electorate at all,” he says. And we need humility because we need to listen to one another. Those two things will always be in tension.

The Trump presidency suggests there’s too much conviction and not enough humility in our current culture.

“The personal question, the existential question that faces you and I and every thinking human being, is, ‘How do you maintain an open mind toward others and yet, at the same time, keep your strong moral convictions?’” Lynch says. “That’s an issue for all of us.”

To be intellectually humble doesn’t mean giving up on the ideas we love and believe in. It just means we need to be thoughtful in choosing our convictions, be open to adjusting them, seek out their flaws, and never stop being curious about why we believe what we believe. Again, that’s not easy

#### Fairness- Debate is a game one winner one loser, speech times , tabula rasa judging, concessions etc… all prove it’s an intrinsic good. Skirting negative research and preparations gives the aff an unfair advantage which should be rejected

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#### The aff’s micropolitical focus forecloses effective anti-capitalist politics – rejecting individualist fantasies is crucial to a collective future

**Dean 12** [Jodi, Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, *The Communist Horizon*, Verso: Brooklyn, NY, 2012, p. 12-19]

Some might object to my use of the second-person plural "we" and "us"-what do you mean "we"? This objection is symptomatic of the fragmentation that has pervaded the Left in Europe, the U K, and North America. Reducing invocations of "we" and "us" to sociological statements requiting a concrete, delineable, empirical referent, it erases the division necessary for politics as if interest and will were only and automatically attributes of a fixed social position. We-skepticism displaces the performative component of the second-person plural as it treats collectivity with suspicion and privileges a fantasy of individual singularity and autonomy. I write "we" hoping to enhance a partisan sense of collectivity. My break with conventions of w1iting that reinforce individualism by admonishing attempts to think and speak as part of a larger collective subject is deliberate. The boundaries to what can be thought as politics in certain segments of the post-structuralist and anarchist Left only benefit capital. Some activists and theorists think that micropolitical activities, whether practices of self-cultivation or individual consumer choices, are more important loci of action than large-scale organized movement-an assumption which adds to the difficulty of building new types of organizations because it makes thinking in terms of collectivity rarer, harder, and seemingly less "fresh." Similarly, some activists and theorists treat aesthetic objects and creative works as displaying a political potentiality missing from classes, parties, and unions. This aesthetic focus disconnects politics from the organized struggle of working people, making politics into what spectators see. Artistic products, whether actual commodities or commodified experiences, thereby buttress capital as they circulate political affects while displacing political struggles from the streets to the galleries. Spectators can pay (or donate) to feel radical without having to get their hands dirty. The dominant class retains its position and the contradiction between this class and the rest of us doesn't make itself felt as such. The celebration of momentary actions and singular happenings-the playful disruption, the temporarily controversial film or novel-works the same way. Some on the anarchist and post-structuralist Left treat these flickers as the only proper instances of a contemporary left politics. A pointless action involving the momentary expenditure of enormous effort-the artistic equivalent of the 5k and 10k runs to fight cancer, that is to say, to increase awareness of cancer without actually doing much else-the singular happening disconnects task from goal. Any "sense" it makes, any meaning or relevance it has, is up to the spectator (perhaps with a bit of guidance from curators and theorists). Occupation contrasts sharply with the singular happening. Even as specific occupations emerge from below rather than through a coordinated strategy, their common form-including its images, slogans, terms, and practices-links them together in a mass struggle. The power of the return of communism stands or falls on its capacity to inspire large-scale organized collective struggle toward a goal. For over thirty years, the Left has eschewed such a goal, accepting instead liberal notions that goals are strictly individual lifestyle choices or social-democratic claims that history already solved basic problems of distribution with the compromise of regulated markets and welfare states – a solution the Right rejected and capitalism destroyed. The Left failed to defend a vision of a better world, an egalitarian world of common production by and for the collective people. Instead, it accommodated capital, succumbing to the lures of individualism, consumerism, competition, and privilege, and proceeding as if there really were no alternative to states that rule in the interests of markets. Marx expressed the basic principle of the alternative over a hundred years ago: from each according to ability, to each according to need. This principle contains the urgency of the struggle for its own realization. We don't have to continue to live in the wake of left failure, stuck in the repetitions of crises and spectacle. In light of the planetary climate disaster and the ever-intensifying global class war as states redistribute wealth to the rich in the name of austerity, the absence of a common goal is the absence of a future (other than the ones imagined in post-apocalyptic scenarios like Mad Max). The premise of communism is that collective determination of collective conditions is possible, if we want it. To help incite this desire, to add to its reawakening force and presence, I treat "communism" as a tag for six features of our current setting: 1. A specific image of the Soviet Union and its collapse; 2 . A present, increasingly powerful force; 3 . The sovereignty of the people; 4. The common and the commons; 5. The egalitarian and universalist desire that cuts through the circuits and practices in which we are trapped; 6. The party. The first two features can be loosely associated with the politics that configures itself via a history linked to the end of the Soviet Union as a state, as refracted through the dominance of the US as a state. What matters here is less the historical narrative than the expression of communism as the force of an absence. My discussion of these first two features highlights how the absence of communism shapes our contemporary setting. In the sequence narrative as the triumph of capitalism and liberal democracy, the communist horizon makes itself felt as a "signifying stress." This is Eric L. Santner's term for a way that reality expresses its nonidentity with itself. As Santner explains, the "social formation in which we find ourselves immersed" is "fissured by lack" and "permeated by inconsistency and incompleteness." The lack calls out to us. Inconsistency and incompleteness make themselves felt. "What is registered," Santner explains, "are not so much forgotten deeds but forgotten failures to act. "7 The frenetic activity of contemporary communicative capitalism deflects us away from these gaps. New entertainments, unshakeable burdens, and growing debt displace our attention toward the immediate and the coming-up-next as they attempt to drown out the forceful effects of the unrealized-the unrealized potentials of unions and collective struggle, the unrealized claims for equality distorted by a culture that celebrates the excesses of the very rich, the unrealized achievements of collective solidarity in redressing poverty and redistributing risks and rewards. The first two chapters thus treat the gaps, fissures, and lack Santner theorizes as signifying stresses in terms of a missing communism that makes itself felt in the setting configured by its alleged failure and defeat.

#### The impact is neofeudalism that causes global catastrophe – only communist struggle is sufficient to respond

Dean 20 – the author of nine books, most recently Comrade: An Essay on Political Belonging (Verso 2019). (Jodi, Communism or Neo-Feudalism?, New Political Science, DOI: 10.1080/07393148.2020.1718974 Feb 2020)// gcd

So, again, I accept Wark’s provocation to consider that we are not under capitalism but something worse. And I respond by drawing out the tendencies in the present that point beyond capitalism to this something worse, to a neo-feudalism of new lords and new serfs, a micro-elite of platform billionaires and the massive service sector or sector of servants. Insofar as I am emphasizing tendencies toward neo-feudalism, my response to Wark is premised on the idea that capitalism has always overlapped with, relied on, and exploited other modes of production and accumulation. Indeed, capitalism makes them worse, dismantling the conditions to which they were adapted and subjecting them to alien laws. Today capitalism is making itself into something worse as its processes of real subsumption turn in on themselves. Communicative capitalism’s monopoly concentration, intensified inequality, and subjection of the state to the market are resulting in a neofeudalism where accumulation occurs as much through rent, debt, and power as it does through commodity production. Globally, in the knowledge and tech industries, for example, rental income accruing from intellectual property rights exceeds income from the production of goods.1 In the United States (US), financial services contribute more to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) than manufactured goods.2 Increasingly, capital is not reinvested in production; it is hoarded, eaten up, or redistributed as rents. Value is thus decreasingly self-valorizing. Valorization processes have spread far beyond the factory, into complex, speculative, and unstable circuits increasingly dependent on surveillance, coercion, and violence. Communicative capitalism is at a crossroads: communism or neo-feudalism. Communism names that emancipatory egalitarian mode of association to which we should aspire and for which we have to organize and fight. Neo-feudalism names the something worse that capitalism has become and is becoming. It is what happens if we do not fight back. Four Features of Neo-Feudalism Neo-feudalism is characterized by four interlocking features: 1) the parcelization of sovereignty; 2) hierarchy and expropriation with new lords and peasants; 3) desolate hinterlands and privileged municipalities; and, 4) insecurity and catastrophism. I address each in turn. Parcelization of Sovereignty Marxist historians Perry Anderson and Ellen Meiksins Wood present the parcelization of sovereignty as a key feature of feudalism. Two aspects of the parcelization of sovereignty are important for understanding neo-feudalism: fragmentation and extra-economic coercion. First, state functions are “vertically and horizontally fragmented.” 3 Local arrangements occur in a variety of forms as different sorts of political and economic authorities claim right and jurisdiction. Arbitration and compromise take the place of the rule of law. The line between legal and illegal becomes weaker. Second, with the parcelization of sovereignty political authority and economic power blend together. Feudal lords extracted a surplus from peasants through legal coercion, legal in part because the lords decided the law that applied to the peasants in their jurisdiction. Neo-feudal lords like global financial institutions and digital technology platforms use debt to redistribute wealth from the world’s poorest to the richest. In both the feudal and the neo-feudal versions, economic actors exercise political power over a particular group of people on the basis of terms and conditions that the economic actors, the lords, set. At the same time, political power is exercised with and as economic power, not only taxes but fines, liens, asset seizures, licenses, patents, jurisdictions, and borders. Under neo-feudalism, the legal fictions of a bourgeois state determined by the forms of neutral law and free and equal individuals break down and the directly political character of society reasserts itself. Consider some contemporary examples of fragmentation and the merger of state and economic authority characteristic of the parcelization of sovereignty. Ten percent of global wealth is hoarded in off-shore accounts to avoid taxation, that is, to escape the reach of state law. Law does not apply to billionaires powerful enough to evade it. Correlatively, the largest tech companies have valuations greater than the economies of most of the world’s countries. Cities and states relate to Apple, Amazon, Microsoft, Facebook, and Google/ Alphabet as if these corporations were themselves sovereign states. Cities negotiate with, try to attract, and cooperate with these firms on the firm’s own terms. Immense concentrated wealth has its own constituent power, the power to constitute the rules it will follow – or not. In the same vein, foreign investors have the right to sue state governments in international tribunals. They often do this when public interest regulations designed to protect water, communities, and the environment threaten to reduce the value of their investments. A large number of these cases are brought by Canadian mining exploration firms against Latin American governments. According to Manuel Perez- Rocha and Jen Moore, “The corporations are allowed to bypass domestic courts and sue governments before private tribunals, such as the World Bank-affiliated International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes. The tribunal members are highly paid corporate lawyers who have no obligation to consider the rights of local communities or the importance of health and environmental protections.” 5 Private tribunals take the place of state law.

#### The alternative is to orient political and social struggle toward the communist horizon – this redirection is crucial to redefine the political futures psychoanalytically imagineable– anything less is mere apologism for continued leftist failure

**Dean 12** [Jodi, Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, *The Communist Horizon*, Verso: Brooklyn, NY, 2012, p. 1-12]

The term "horizon" marks a division. Understood spatially, the horizon is the line dividing the visible, separating earth from sky. Understood temporally, the horizon converges with loss in a metaphor for privation and depletion. The "lost horizon" suggests abandoned projects, prior hopes that have now passed away. Astrophysics offers a thrilling, even uncanny, horizon: the "event horizon" surrounding a black hole. The event horizon is the boundary beyond which events cannot escape. Although "event horizon" denotes the curvature in space/time effected by a singularity, it's not much different from the spatial horizon. Both evoke a fundamental division that we experience as impossible to reach, and that we can neither escape nor cross. I use "horizon" not to recall a forgotten future but to designate a dimension of experience that we can never lose, even if, lost in a fog or focused on our feet, we fail to see it. The horizon is Real in the sense of impossible-we can never reach it-and in the sense of actual (Jacques Lacan's notion of the Real includes both these senses). The horizon shapes our setting. We can lose our bearings, but the horizon is a necessary dimension of our actuality. Whether the effect of a singularity or the meeting of earth and sky, the horizon is the fundamental division establishing where we are. With respect to politics, the horizon that conditions our expe1ience is communism. I get the term "communist horizon" from Bruno Bosteels. In The Actuality of Communism, Bosteels engages with the work of Alvaro Garcia Linera. Garcia Linera ran as Evo Morales's vice presidential ru1ming mate in the Bolivian Movement for Socialism-Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples (MAS-IPSP). He is the author of multiple pieces on Marxism, politics, and sociology, at least one of which was written while he served time in prison for promoting an armed uprising (before becoming vice president of Bolivia, he fought in the Tupac Kataii Guerrilla Army). Bosteels quotes Garcia Linera's response to an interviewer's questions about his party's plans following their electoral victim)': "The general horizon of the era is communist."1 Garcia Linera doesn't explain the term. Rather, as Bosteels points out, Garcia Linera invokes the communist horizon "as if it were the most natural thing in the world," as if it were so obvious as to need neither explanation nor justification. He assumes the communist horizon as an ineducible feature of the political setting: "We enter the movement with our expecting and desiring eyes set upon the communist horizon." For Garcia Linera, communism conditions the actuality of politics. Some on the Left dismiss the communist horizon as a lost horizon. For example, in a postmodern pluralist approach that appeals to many on the Left, the economists writing as J. K . Gibson-Graham reject communism, offering "post-capitalism" in its stead. They argue that descriptions of capitalism as a global system miss the rich diversity of practices, relations, and desires constituting yet exceeding the economy and so advocate "reading the economy for difference rather than dominance" (as if dominance neither presupposes nor relies on difference).2 In their view, reading for difference opens up new possibilities for politics as it reveals previously unacknowledged loci of creative action within everyday economic activities. Gibson-Graham do not present Marxism as a failed ideology or communism as the fossilized remainder of an historical expe1iment gone horribly wrong. On the contrary, they draw inspiration from Marx’s appreciation of the social character of labor. They engage Jean-Luc Nancy's emphasis on communism as an idea that is the "index of a task of thought still and increasingly open." They embrace the reclamation of the commons. And they are concerned with neoliberalism's naturalization of the economy as a force exceeding the capacity of people to steer or transform it. Yet at the same time, Gibson-Graham push away from communism to launch their vision of postcapitalism. Communism is that against which they construct their alterative conception of the economy. It's a constitutive force, present as a shaping of the view they advocate. Even as Nancy's evocation of communism serves as a horizon for their thinking, they explicitly jettison the term "communism," which they position as the object of "widespread aversion" and which they associate with the "dangers of posing a positivity, a nonnative representation." Rejecting the positive notion of "communism," they opt for a te1m that suggests an empty relationally to the capitalist system they ostensibly deny, "post-capitalism." For Gibson-Graham, the term "capitalist" is not a term of critique or opprobrium; it's not part of a manifesto. The term is a cause of the political problems facing the contemporary Left. They argue that the discursive dominance of capitalism embeds the Left in paranoia, melancholia, and moralism. Gibson-Graham's view is a specific instance of a general assumption shared by leftists who embrace a generic post-capitalism but eschew a more militant anticapitalism. Instead of actively opposing capitalism, this tendency redirects anticapitalist energies into efforts to open up discussions and find ethical spaces for decision-and this in a world where one bond trader can bring down a bank in a matter of minutes. I take the opposite position. The dominance of capitalism, the capitalist system, is material. Rather than entrapping us in paranoid fantasy, an analysis that treats capitalism as a global system of appropriation, exploitation, and circulation that enriches the few as it dispossesses the many and that has to expend an enormous amount of energy in doing so can anger, incite, and galvanize. Historically, in theory and in practice, critical analysis of capitalist exploitation has been a powerful weapon in collective struggle. It persists as such today, in global acknowledgment of the excesses of neoliberal capitalism. As recently became clear in worldwide rioting, protest, and revolution, linking multiple sites of exploitation to narrow channels of privilege can replace melancholic fatalism with new assertions of will, desire, and collective strength. The problem of the Left hasn't been our adherence to a Marxist critique of capitalism. It's that we have lost sight of the communist horizon, a glimpse of which new political movements are starting to reveal. Sometimes capitalists, conservatives, and liberal democrats use a rhetoric that treats communism as a lost horizon. But usually they keep communism firmly within their sight. They see communism as a threat, twenty years after its ostensible demise. To them, communism is so threatening that they premise political discussion on the repression of the communist alternative. In response to left critiques of democracy for its failure to protect the interests of poor and workingclass people, conservatives and liberals alike scold that "everybody knows" and "history shows" that communism doesn't work. Communism might be a nice ideal, they concede, but it always leads to violent, authoritarian excesses of power. They shift the discussion to communism, trying to establish the limits of reasonable debate. Their critique of communism establishes the political space and condition of democracy. Before the conversation even gets going, liberals, democrats, capitalists, and conservatives unite to block communism from consideration. It's off the table. Those who suspect that the inclusion of liberals and democrats in a set with capitalists and conservatives is illegitimate are probably democrats themselves. To determine whether they belong in the set of those who fear communism, they should consider whether they think any evocation of communism should come with qualifications, apologies, and condemnations of past excesses. If the answer is "yes," then we have a clear indication that liberal democrats, and probably radical democrats as well, still consider communism a threat that must be suppressed-and so they belong in a set with capitalists and conservatives. All are anxious about the forces that communist desire risks unleashing. There are good reasons for liberals, democrats, capitalists, and conservatives to be anxious. Over the last decade a return to communism has re-energized the Left. Communism is again becoming a discourse and vocabulary for the expression of universal, egalitarian, and revolutionary ideals. In March 2009, the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities hosted a conference entitled "On the Idea of Communism." Initially planned for about 200 people, the conference ultimately attracted over 1 ,200, requiring a spillover room to accommodate those who couldn't fit in the primary auditorium. Since then, multiple conferences-in Paris, Berlin, and New York-and publications have followed, with contributions from such leading scholars as Alain Badiou, Etienne Balibar, Bruno Bosteels, Susan Buck-Morss, Costas Douzinas, Peter Hallward, Michael Hardt, Antonio Neg1i, Jacques Ranciere, Alberto Toscano, and Slavoj Zizek. The conferences and publications consolidate discussions that have been going on for decades. For over thirty years, Antonio Negri has sought to build a new approach to communism out of a Marxism reworked via Spinoza and the Italian political experiments of the 1970s. The Empire trilogy that Negri coauthored with Michael Hardt offers an affirmative, non-dialectical reconceptualization of labor, power, and the State, a new theory of communism from below. Alain Badiou has been occupied with communism for over forty years, from his philosophical and political engagement with Maoism, to his emphasis on the "communist invariants"-egalitarian justice, disciplinary tenor, political volunteerism, and trust in the people-to his recent appeal to the communist Idea. Communism is not a new interest for Slavoj Zizek either. In early 2001 he put together a conference and subsequent volume rethinking Lenin. Where Negri and Badiou reject the Party and the State, Zizek retains a certain fidelity to Lenin. "The key 'Leninist' lesson today," he writes, is that "politics without the organizational form of the Party is politics without politics."4 In short, a vital area of radical philosophy considers communism a contemporary name for emancipation)', egalitarian politics and form part of the communist legacy. These ongoing theoretical discussions overlap with the changing political sequences marked by 1968 and 1989. They also overlap with the spread of neoliberal capitalist domination, a domination accompanied by extremes in economic inequality, ethnic hatred, and police violence, as well as by widespread militancy, insurgency, occupation, and revolution. The current emphasis on communism thus exceeds the coincidence of academic conferences calling specifically for communism's return with the new millennium's debt crises, austerity measures, increased unemployment, and overall sacrifice of the achievements of the modern welfare state to the private interests of financial institutions deemed too big to fail. Already in an interview in 2002, p1ior to his election to the Bolivian presidency, Evo Morales had announced that "the neoliberal system was a failure, and now it's the poor people's turn."·' Communism is reemerging as a magnet of political energy because it is and has been the alterative to capitalism. The communist horizon is not lost. It is Real. In this book, I explore some of the ways the communist horizon manifests itself to us today. As Bosteels argues, to invoke the communist horizon is to produce "a complete shift in perspective or a radical ideological turnabout, as a result of which capitalism no longer appears as the only game in town and we no longer have to be ashamed to set our expecting and desiring eyes here and now on a different organization of social relationships."6 With communism as our horizon, the field of possibilities for revolutionary theory and practice starts to change shape. Barriers to action fall away. New potentials and challenges come to the fore. Anything is possible. Instead of a politics thought primarily in terms of resistance, playful and momentary aesthetic disruptions, the immediate specificity of local projects, and struggles for hegemony within a capitalist parliamentary setting, the communist horizon impresses upon us the necessity to abolish capitalism and to create global practices and institutions of egalitarian cooperation. The shift in perspective the communist horizon produces turns us away from the democratic milieu that has been the form of the loss of communism as a name for left aspiration and toward the reconfiguration of the components of political struggle-in other words, away from general inclusion, momentary calls for broad awareness, and lifestyle changes, and toward militant opposition, tight organizational forms (party, council, working group, cell), and the sovereignty of the people over the economy through which we produce and reproduce ourselves.

## Case

### 1NC- Frontline

#### Black liberation theology can’t overcome western biases

Hlulani M. Mdingi, 20. Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa. "The black church as the timeless witness to change and paradigm shifts posed by the Fourth Industrial Revolution." HTS Theological Studies 76, no. 2 (2020): 1-9.

The current technological and scientific developments of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) signal great leaps in human intellect and creativity. At the crossroad of great steps into the future, a future that will be determined by science and innovation, the smeared bond between theology and science recoils upon theological consideration of human intellect. Black liberation theology has stressed a change in paradigm, which takes oppression, class and intellect seriously. This research seeks to elaborate that a general acceptance of human intellect and science tends to ignore that modern-day science is part of Western civilisation. The Western world view remains dominant in the world. It will be argued that while the 4IR is important, the intellect, politics, economics and need for a 4IR, however, remain synonymous with the need of the West to 'civilise' the world. Institutions such as the World Economic Forum are Western institutions and still represent the goals of Western civilisation. This article argues that great leaps in science must be measured by the Christian church's commitment to eschatology and a building of an egalitarian society on earth. The article seeks to explore if the notion of a black church can be instrumental in the 4IR for focusing on the human condition and humanity of the oppressed in Africa and Latin America. The article argues that the church's role is to witness great change in society and it must be prepared to actively respond to great societal change posed by the 4IR.

#### Surveillance is not a unified, totalizing system of juridical violence

Currah 14 – Paisley Currah, Professor of Political Science and Women’s & Gender Studies at Brooklyn College and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, M.A and Ph.D. in Government from Cornell University, “The State”, TSQ: Transgender Studies Quarterly, Volume 1, Numbers 1-2, May

For the Left, however, the liberal state and the principles of political equality it celebrates conceal the maldistribution of equality. A certain domesticated form of selfhood is reproduced when individuals petition the government for recognition of their particular selves and, in turn, recognize themselves when they are hailed by various state apparatuses — interpolation is the term of art used to describe this relationship. From this more radical perspective, then, the transgender rights movement is merely insisting that the hailing be more accurate. A transgender man will now have an M on his driver's license, and the police officer who stops him on the street may call him “sir” rather than “ma'am.” But the power of the state to surveil individuals and to regulate gender remains intact. While the political approach of many trans legal advocates requires them to naturalize gender identity, the more radical trans Left recognizes that “sex” cannot be made to fit into a rigid presocial biological schema of male and female. On the question of sex classification, the goal should not be to install the “right” definition of sex in the regulatory architecture to make the legal recognition of transition possible but to get the state out of the business of defining sex in the first place.

Both the classical liberal theory of the state and the Left's critical rejoinder, however, lack the capacity or perhaps the flexibility to account for contradictions in policies for sex reclassification. Perhaps what underlies the inability to account for contradictions in sex classification is the belief that the state actions should manifest an underlying coherence. In fact, the hope — or fear — that we are governed by a single, rational legal structure is belied by the existence of a virtually uncountable number of state institutions, processes, offices, and political jurisdictions. In the United States, for example, when some individuals cross borders, walk into a government office to apply for benefits, get a driver's license, go to jail or prison, sign up for selective service, try to get married, or have any interaction with any state actor, the sex classification of some people can and often does switch. Even within a single jurisdiction, almost every particular state agency — from federal to municipal — has the authority to decide its own rules for sex classification. To complicate matters even more, both state and federal judges have found that one's sex classification for one social function may not hold for others. These include legislatures, courts, departments, agencies, elected officials, political appointees, public servants, constitutions, laws, regulations, administrative rules, and informal norms and practices. These intertwined and sprawling apparatuses all rest, sometimes uneasily, on diachronous layers of sedimented yet still active historical state formations. Given this disarray, it is not surprising that different state entities might sometimes advance different, even incommensurate, projects. Indeed, how could they not?

According to Gilles Deleuze, a concept “should express an event rather than an essence” (1995: 14). Molar, large-scale accounts of sex and the state have assumed a sameness to sex and a singular rationality to state actors, decisions, and projects. If the state is not unitary, coordinated, and hierarchically organized in an ultimately rational way — if, as Michel Foucault suggests, “the state is only a composite reality and a mythicized abstraction whose importance is much less than we think” (1991: 103) — then it should come as no surprise that state definitions of sex are also plural. A contradiction is something that does not make sense, a position that is logically inconsistent. To begin by letting go of the assumption that there is any “there there,” any whatness, to (legal) sex apart from what an agency says it is, the contradiction evaporates. The official sex designation — or, more precisely, the M or the F — stamped on documents or coded in records becomes the starting point. Then an analysis can focus not on what sex is, or what it should be, but on what it does, what it accomplishes, what it produces. Indeed, if the only thing we know for sure about sex is what any of these many state actors say it is in any particular instance, sex will turn out to be as messy and diffuse a concept as the state. Entering into the analysis without a firm sense of what sex is or what the state is — as a priori facts, as edifices — makes the processes through which they come into being more visible. It might be better to defer attempts to resolve — theoretically or politically — the messiness in order to understand what a particular system of sex designation does for a particular state project such as recognition or redistribution (Currah, forthcoming).

Of course, states should not only or always be imagined as messy, scattered nodes of local and arbitrary power arrangements. The Leviathan state's terrible concentrated authority to impose sanctions (death, imprisonment, fines) has been the subject of theories of sovereignty for centuries. For this purpose, the most apt definition of the state begins with the simple description from Max Weber: “A human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate physical violence within a particular given territory” (1991: 78). To create a truly compelling account of sovereign violence and the paradox of sovereignty, one must take Weber's definition, put question marks around “legitimate,” and add the observation made by scholars such as Walter Benjamin, Carl Schmitt, Hannah Arendt, Jacques Derrida, and Giorgio Agamben that the force that creates the law and makes it legitimate cannot be justified by a law that does not yet exist. Still, much of what states do — regulating the health, safety, and public welfare through myriad regulations, rules, decisions, practices — does not reach the threshold of juridical violence, even if those actions are ultimately undergirded by its threat. Fetishizing a generalized idea of the state and its terrifying or redemptive power (depending on one's perspective) can obscure what is actually happening in the local, micro, particular sites where most public authority is exercised. While it is crucial to theorize the singular finality of state violence, neglecting to examine the messiness of actually existing and potentially incommensurate policies, practices, rules, and norms risks substituting the conceptual for the concrete and gets in the way of understanding what might actually be going on (Latour 1995: 48).

#### Prosaic material incentives explain contemporary anti-blackness far better than ontology

**Harari 15** [Yuval Noah Harari, Israeli historian and a tenured professor in the Department of History at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, specializing in World History, Doctorate in Philosophy from Oxford University, and an acclaimed author whose first book, Sapiens, was an international bestseller that received lavish praise by figures ranging from Barack Obama to Bill Gates, *Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind,* tr. by Yuval Harari with help from John Purcell and Haim Watzman, HarperCollins: Broadway, NY, 2015, p. 133-144]

UNDERSTANDING HUMAN HISTORY IN THE millennia following the Agricultural Revolution boils down to a single question: how did humans organise themselves in mass-cooperation networks, when they lacked the biological instincts necessary to sustain such networks? The short answer is that humans created imagined orders and devised scripts. These two inventions filled the gaps left by our biological inheritance.

However, the appearance of these networks was, for many, a dubious blessing. The imagined orders sustaining these networks were neither neutral nor fair. They divided people into make-believe groups, arranged in a hierarchy. The upper levels enjoyed privileges and power, while the lower ones suffered from discrimination and oppression. Hammurabi’s Code, for example, established a pecking order of superiors, commoners and slaves. Superiors got all the good things in life. Commoners got what was left. Slaves got a beating if they complained.

Despite its proclamation of the equality of all men, the imagined order established by the Americans in 1776 also established a hierarchy. It created a hierarchy between men, who benefited from it, and women, whom it left disempowered. It created a hierarchy between whites, who enjoyed liberty, and blacks and American Indians, who were considered humans of a lesser type and therefore did not share in the equal rights of men. Many of those who signed the Declaration of Independence were slaveholders. They did not release their slaves upon signing the Declaration, nor did they consider themselves hypocrites. In their view, the rights of men had little to do with Negroes.

The American order also consecrated the hierarchy between rich and poor. Most Americans at that time had little problem with the inequality caused by wealthy parents passing their money and businesses on to their children. In their view, equality meant simply that the same laws applied to rich and poor. It had nothing to do with unemployment benefits, integrated education or health insurance.

Liberty, too, carried very different connotations than it does today. In 1776, it did not mean that the disempowered (certainly not blacks or Indians or, God forbid, women) could gain and exercise power. It meant simply that the state could not, except in unusual circumstances, confiscate a citizen’s private property or tell him what to do with it. The American order thereby upheld the hierarchy of wealth, which some thought was mandated by God and others viewed as representing the immutable laws of nature. Nature, it was claimed, rewarded merit with wealth while penalising indolence.

All the above-mentioned distinctions – between free persons and slaves, between whites and blacks, between rich and poor – are rooted in fictions. (The hierarchy of men and women will be discussed later.) Yet it is an iron rule of history that every imagined hierarchy disavows its fictional origins and claims to be natural and inevitable. For instance, many people who have viewed the hierarchy of free persons and slaves as natural and correct have argued that slavery is not a human invention. Hammurabi saw it as ordained by the gods. Aristotle argued that slaves have a ‘slavish nature’ whereas free people have a ‘free nature’. Their status in society is merely a reflection of their innate nature.

Ask white supremacists about the racial hierarchy, and you are in for a pseudoscientific lecture concerning the biological differences between the races. You are likely to be told that there is something in Caucasian blood or genes that makes whites naturally more intelligent, moral and hardworking. Ask a diehard capitalist about the hierarchy of wealth, and you are likely to hear that it is the inevitable outcome of objective differences in abilities. The rich have more money, in this view, because they are more capable and diligent. No one should be bothered, then, if the wealthy get better health care, better education and better nutrition. The rich richly deserve every perk they enjoy.

People with lighter skin colour are typically more in danger of sunburn than people with darker skin. Yet there was no biological logic behind the division of South African beaches. Beaches reserved for people with lighter skin were not characterised by lower levels of ultraviolet radiation.

Hindus who adhere to the caste system believe that cosmic forces have made one caste superior to another. According to a famous Hindu creation myth, the gods fashioned the world out of the body of a primeval being, the Purusa. The sun was created from the Purusa’s eye, the moon from the Purusa’s brain, the Brahmins (priests) from its mouth, the Kshatriyas (warriors) from its arms, the Vaishyas (peasants and merchants) from its thighs, and the Shudras (servants) from its legs. Accept this explanation and the sociopolitical differences between Brahmins and Shudras are as natural and eternal as the differences between the sun and the moon.1 The ancient Chinese believed that when the goddess Nü Wa created humans from earth, she kneaded aristocrats from fine yellow soil, whereas commoners were formed from brown mud.2

Yet, to the best of our understanding, these hierarchies are all the product of human imagination. Brahmins and Shudras were not really created by the gods from different body parts of a primeval being. Instead, the distinction between the two castes was created by laws and norms invented by humans in northern India about 3,000 years ago. Contrary to Aristotle, there is no known biological difference between slaves and free people. Human laws and norms have turned some people into slaves and others into masters. Between blacks and whites there are some objective biological differences, such as skin colour and hair type, but there is no evidence that the differences extend to intelligence or morality.

Most people claim that their social hierarchy is natural and just, while those of other societies are based on false and ridiculous criteria. Modern Westerners are taught to scoff at the idea of racial hierarchy. They are shocked by laws prohibiting blacks to live in white neighbourhoods, or to study in white schools, or to be treated in white hospitals. But the hierarchy of rich and poor – which mandates that rich people live in separate and more luxurious neighbourhoods, study in separate and more prestigious schools, and receive medical treatment in separate and better-equipped facilities – seems perfectly sensible to many Americans and Europeans. Yet it’s a proven fact that most rich people are rich for the simple reason that they were born into a rich family, while most poor people will remain poor throughout their lives simply because they were born into a poor family.

Unfortunately, complex human societies seem to require imagined hierarchies and unjust discrimination. Of course not all hierarchies are morally identical, and some societies suffered from more extreme types of discrimination than others, yet scholars know of no large society that has been able to dispense with discrimination altogether. Time and again people have created order in their societies by classifying the population into imagined categories, such as superiors, commoners and slaves; whites and blacks; patricians and plebeians; Brahmins and Shudras; or rich and poor. These categories have regulated relations between millions of humans by making some people legally, politically or socially superior to others.

Hierarchies serve an important function. They enable complete strangers to know how to treat one another without wasting the time and energy needed to become personally acquainted. In George Bernard Shaw’s Pygmalion, Henry Higgins doesn’t need to establish an intimate acquaintance with Eliza Doolittle in order to understand how he should relate to her. Just hearing her talk tells him that she is a member of the underclass with whom he can do as he wishes – for example, using her as a pawn in his bet to pass off a jower girl as a duchess. A modern Eliza working at a jorist’s needs to know how much effort to put into selling roses and gladioli to the dozens of people who enter the shop each day. She can’t make a detailed enquiry into the tastes and wallets of each individual.

Instead, she uses social cues – the way the person is dressed, his or her age, and if she’s not politically correct his skin colour. That is how she immediately distinguishes between the accounting-firm partner who’s likely to place a large order for expensive roses, and a messenger boy who can only afford a bunch of daisies.

Of course, differences in natural abilities also play a role in the formation of social distinctions. But such diversities of aptitudes and character are usually mediated through imagined hierarchies. This happens in two important ways. First and foremost, most abilities have to be nurtured and developed. Even if somebody is born with a particular talent, that talent will usually remain latent if it is not fostered, honed and exercised. Not all people get the same chance to cultivate and refine their abilities. Whether or not they have such an opportunity will usually depend on their place within their society’s imagined hierarchy. Harry Potter is a good example. Removed from his distinguished wizard family and brought up by ignorant muggles, he arrives at Hogwarts without any experience in magic. It takes him seven books to gain a firm command of his powers and knowledge of his unique abilities.

Second, even if people belonging to different classes develop exactly the same abilities, they are unlikely to enjoy equal success because they will have to play the game by different rules. If, in British-ruled India, an Untouchable, a Brahmin, a Catholic Irishman and a Protestant Englishman had somehow developed exactly the same business acumen, they still would not have had the same chance of becoming rich. The economic game was rigged by legal restrictions and unoɽcial glass ceilings.

The Vicious Circle

All societies are based on imagined hierarchies, but not necessarily on the same hierarchies. What accounts for the differences? Why did traditional Indian society classify people according to caste, Ottoman society according to religion, and American society according to race? In most cases the hierarchy originated as the result of a set of accidental historical circumstances and was then perpetuated and refined over many generations as different groups developed vested interests in it.

For instance, many scholars surmise that the Hindu caste system took shape when Indo-Aryan people invaded the Indian subcontinent about 3,000 years ago, subjugating the local population. The invaders established a stratified society, in which they – of course – occupied the leading positions (priests and warriors), leaving the natives to live as servants and slaves. The invaders, who were few in number, feared losing their privileged status and unique identity. To forestall this danger, they divided the population into castes, each of which was required to pursue a specific occupation or perform a specific role in society. Each had different legal status, privileges and duties. Mixing of castes – social interaction, marriage, even the sharing of meals – was prohibited. And the distinctions were not just legal – they became an inherent part of religious mythology and practice.

The rulers argued that the caste system rejected an eternal cosmic reality rather than a chance historical development. Concepts of purity and impurity were essential elements in Hindu religion, and they were harnessed to buttress the social pyramid. Pious Hindus were taught that contact with members of a different caste could pollute not only them personally, but society as a whole, and should therefore be abhorred. Such ideas are hardly unique to Hindus. Throughout history, and in almost all societies, concepts of pollution and purity have played a leading role in enforcing social and political divisions and have been exploited by numerous ruling classes to maintain their privileges. The fear of pollution is not a complete fabrication of priests and princes, however. It probably has its roots in biological survival mechanisms that make humans feel an instinctive revulsion towards potential disease carriers, such as sick persons and dead bodies. If you want to keep any human group isolated – women, Jews, Roma, gays, blacks – the best way to do it is convince everyone that these people are a source of pollution.

The Hindu caste system and its attendant laws of purity became deeply embedded in Indian culture. Long after the Indo-Aryan invasion was forgotten, Indians continued to believe in the caste system and to abhor the pollution caused by caste mixing. Castes were not immune to change. In fact, as time went by, large castes were divided into sub-castes. Eventually the original four castes turned into 3,000 different groupings called jati (literally ‘birth’). But this proliferation of castes did not change the basic principle of the system, according to which every person is born into a particular rank, and any infringement of its rules pollutes the person and society as a whole. A persons jati determines her profession, the food she can eat, her place of residence and her eligible marriage partners. Usually a person can marry only within his or her caste, and the resulting children inherit that status.

Whenever a new profession developed or a new group of people appeared on the scene, they had to be recognised as a caste in order to receive a legitimate place within Hindu society. Groups that failed to win recognition as a caste were, literally, outcasts – in this stratified society, they did not even occupy the lowest rung. They became known as Untouchables. They had to live apart from all other people and scrape together a living in humiliating and disgusting ways, such as sifting through garbage dumps for scrap material. Even members of the lowest caste avoided mingling with them, eating with them, touching them and certainly marrying them. In modern India, matters of marriage and work are still heavily influenced by the caste system, despite all attempts by the democratic government of India to break down such distinctions and convince Hindus that there is nothing polluting in caste mixing.3

Purity in America

A similar vicious circle perpetuated the racial hierarchy in modern America. From the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, the European conquerors imported millions of African slaves to work the mines and plantations of America. They chose to import slaves from Africa rather than from Europe or East Asia due to three circumstantial factors. Firstly, Africa was closer, so it was cheaper to import slaves from Senegal than from Vietnam.

Secondly, in Africa there already existed a well-developed slave trade (exporting slaves mainly to the Middle East), whereas in Europe slavery was very rare. It was obviously far easier to buy slaves in an existing market than to create a new one from scratch.

Thirdly, and most importantly, American plantations in places such as Virginia, Haiti and Brazil were plagued by malaria and yellow fever, which had originated in Africa. Africans had acquired over the generations a partial genetic immunity to these diseases, whereas Europeans were totally defenceless and died in droves.

It was consequently wiser for a plantation owner to invest his money in an African slave than in a European slave or indentured labourer. Paradoxically, genetic superiority (in terms of immunity) translated into social inferiority: precisely because Africans were fitter in tropical climates than Europeans, they ended up as the slaves of European masters! Due to these circumstantial factors, the burgeoning new societies of America were to be divided into a ruling caste of white Europeans and a subjugated caste of black Africans.

But people don’t like to say that they keep slaves of a certain race or origin simply because it’s economically expedient. Like the Aryan conquerors of India, white Europeans in the Americas wanted to be seen not only as economically successful but also as pious, just and objective. Religious and scientific myths were pressed into service to justify this division. Theologians argued that Africans descend from Ham, son of Noah, saddled by his father with a curse that his offspring would be slaves. Biologists argued that blacks are less intelligent than whites and their moral sense less developed. Doctors alleged that blacks live in filth and spread diseases – in other words, they are a source of pollution.

These myths struck a chord in American culture, and in Western culture generally. They continued to exert their influence long after the conditions that created slavery had disappeared. In the early nineteenth century imperial Britain outlawed slavery and stopped the Atlantic slave trade, and in the decades that followed slavery was gradually outlawed throughout the American continent.

Notably, this was the first and only time in history that slaveholding societies voluntarily abolished slavery. But, even though the slaves were freed, the racist myths that justified slavery persisted. Separation of the races was maintained by racist legislation and social custom.

The result was a self-reinforcing cycle of cause and effect, a vicious circle.

Consider, for example, the southern United States immediately after the Civil War. In 1865 the Thirteenth Amendment to the US Constitution outlawed slavery and the Fourteenth Amendment mandated that citizenship and the equal protection of the law could not be denied on the basis of race. However, two centuries of slavery meant that most black families were far poorer and far less educated than most white families. A black person born in Alabama in 1865 thus had much less chance of getting a good education and a well-paid job than did his white neighbours. His children, born in the 1880S and 1890s, started life with the same disadvantage – they, too, were born to an uneducated, poor family.

But economic disadvantage was not the whole story. Alabama was also home to many poor whites who lacked the opportunities available to their better-off racial brothers and sisters. In addition, the Industrial Revolution and the waves of immigration made the United States an extremely fluid society, where rags could quickly turn into riches. If money was all that mattered, the sharp divide between the races should soon have blurred, not least through intermarriage.

But that did not happen. By 1865 whites, as well as many blacks, took it to be a simple matter of fact that blacks were less intelligent, more violent and sexually dissolute, lazier and less concerned about personal cleanliness than whites. They were thus the agents of violence, theft, rape and disease – in other words, pollution. If a black Alabaman in 1895 miraculously managed to get a good education and then applied for a respectable job such as a bank teller, his odds of being accepted were far worse than those of an equally qualified white candidate. The stigma that labelled blacks as, by nature, unreliable, lazy and less intelligent conspired against him.

You might think that people would gradually understand that these stigmas were myth rather than fact and that blacks would be able, over time, to prove themselves just as competent, law-abiding and clean as whites. In fact, the opposite happened – these prejudices became more and more entrenched as time went by. Since all the best jobs were held by whites, it became easier to believe that blacks really are inferior. ‘Look,’ said the average white citizen, ‘blacks have been free for generations, yet there are almost no black professors, lawyers, doctors or even bank tellers. Isn’t that proof that blacks are simply less intelligent and hard-working?’ Trapped in this vicious circle, blacks were not hired for whitecollar jobs because they were deemed unintelligent, and the proof of their inferiority was the paucity of blacks in white-collar jobs.

The vicious circle did not stop there. As anti-black stigmas grew stronger, they were translated into a system of ‘Jim Crow’ laws and norms that were meant to safeguard the racial order. Blacks were forbidden to vote in elections, to study in white schools, to buy in white stores, to eat in white restaurants, to sleep in white hotels. The justification for all of this was that blacks were foul, slothful and vicious, so whites had to be protected from them. Whites did not want to sleep in the same hotel as blacks or to eat in the same restaurant, for fear of diseases. They did not want their children learning in the same school as black children, for fear of brutality and bad influences. They did not want blacks voting in elections, since blacks were ignorant and immoral. These fears were substantiated by scientific studies that ‘proved’ that blacks were indeed less educated, that various diseases were more common among them, and that their crime rate was far higher (the studies ignored the fact that these ‘facts’ resulted from discrimination against blacks).

By the mid-twentieth century, segregation in the former Confederate states was probably worse than in the late nineteenth century. Clennon King, a black student who applied to the University of Mississippi in 1958, was forcefully committed to a mental asylum. The presiding judge ruled that a black person must surely be insane to think that he could be admitted to the University of Mississippi.

The vicious circle: a chance historical situation is translated into a rigid social system.

Nothing was as revolting to American southerners (and many northerners) as sexual relations and marriage between black men and white women. Sex between the races became the greatest taboo and any violation, or suspected violation, was viewed as deserving immediate and summary punishment in the form of lynching. The Ku Klux Klan, a white supremacist secret society, perpetrated many such killings. They could have taught the Hindu Brahmins a thing or two about purity laws.

With time, the racism spread to more and more cultural arenas. American aesthetic culture was built around white standards of beauty. The physical attributes of the white race – for example light skin, fair and straight hair, a small upturned nose – came to be identified as beautiful. Typical black features – dark skin, dark and bushy hair, a flattened nose – were deemed ugly. These preconceptions ingrained the imagined hierarchy at an even deeper level of human consciousness.

Such vicious circles can go on for centuries and even millennia, perpetuating an imagined hierarchy that sprang from a chance historical occurrence. Unjust discrimination often gets worse, not better, with time. Money comes to money, and poverty to poverty. Education comes to education, and ignorance to ignorance. Those once victimised by history are likely to be victimised yet again. And those whom history has privileged are more likely to be privileged again.

Most sociopolitical hierarchies lack a logical or biological basis – they are nothing but the perpetuation of chance events supported by myths. That is one good reason to study history. If the division into blacks and whites or Brahmins and Shudras was grounded in biological realities – that is, if Brahmins really had better brains than Shudras – biology would be sufficient for understanding human society. Since the biological distinctions between different groups of Homo sapiens are, in fact, negligible, biology can’t explain the intricacies of Indian society or American racial dynamics. We can only understand those phenomena by studying the events, circumstances, and power relations that transformed figments of imagination into cruel – and very real – social structures.

#### humanism is good --- context is always key and narratives of humanity are contingent

**Lester 12** – (January 2012, Alan, Director of Interdisciplinary Research, Professor of Historical Geography, and Co-Director of the Colonial and Postcolonial Studies Network, University of Sussex, “Humanism, race and the colonial frontier,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, Volume 37, Issue 1, pages 132–148)

Anderson argues that it is not an issue of extending humanity to … negatively racialised people, but of putting into question that from which such people have been excluded – that which, for liberal discourse, remains unproblematised. (2007, 199) I fear, however, that if we direct attention away from histories of humanism’s failure to deal with difference and to render that difference compatible with its fundamental universalism, and if we overlook its proponents’ failed attempts to combat dispossession, murder and oppression; if our history of race is instead understood through a critique of humanity’s conceptual separation from nature, we dilute the political potency of universalism. Historically, it was not humanism that gave rise to racial innatism, it was the specifically anti-humanist politics of settlers forging new social assemblages through relations of violence on colonial frontiers. Settler communities became established social assemblages in their own right specifically through the rejection of humanist interventions. Perhaps, as Edward Said suggested, we can learn from the implementation of humanist universalism in practice, and insist on its potential to combat racism, and perhaps we can insist on the contemporary conceptual hybridisation of human–non-human entities too, without necessarily abandoning all the precepts of humanism (Said 2004; Todorov 2002). We do not necessarily need to accord a specific value to the human, separate from and above nature, in order to make a moral and political case for a fundamental human universalism that can be wielded strategically against racial violence. Nineteenth century humanitarians’ universalism was fundamentally conditioned by their belief that British culture stood at the apex of a hierarchical order of civilisations. From the mid-nineteenth century through to the mid-twentieth century, this ethnocentrism produced what Lyotard describes as ‘the flattening of differences, or the demand for a norm (“human nature”)’, that ‘carries with it its own forms of terror’ (cited Braun 2004, 1352). The intervention of Aboriginal Protection demonstrates that humanist universalism has the potential to inflict such terror (it was the Protectorate of Aborigines Office reincarnated that was responsible, later in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, for Aboriginal Australia’s Stolen Generation, and it was the assimilationist vision of the Protectors’ equivalents in Canada that led to the abuses of the Residential Schools system). But we must not forget that humanism’s alternatives, founded upon principles of difference rather than commonality, have the potential to do the same and even worse. In the nineteenth century, Caribbean planters and then emigrant British settlers emphasised the multiplicity of the human species, the absence of any universal ‘human nature’, the incorrigibility of difference, in their upholding of biological determinism. Their assault on any notion of a fundamental commonality among human beings has disconcerting points of intersection with the radical critique of humanism today. The scientific argument of the nineteenth century that came closest to post-humanism’s insistence on the hybridity of humanity, promising to ‘close the ontological gap between human and non-human animals’ (Day 2008, 49), was the evolutionary theory of biological descent associated with Darwin, and yet this theory was adopted in Aotearoa New Zealand and other colonial sites precisely to legitimate the potential extinction of other, ‘weaker’ races in the face of British colonisation on the grounds of the natural law of a struggle for survival (Stenhouse 1999). Both the upholding and the rejection of human–nature binaries can thus result in racially oppressive actions, depending on the contingent politics of specific social assemblages. Nineteenth century colonial humanitarians, inspired as they were by an irredeemably ethnocentric and religiously exclusive form of universalism, at least combatted exterminatory settler discourses and practices at multiple sites of empire, and provided spaces on mission and protectorate stations in which indigenous peoples could be shielded to a very limited extent from dispossession and murder. They also, unintentionally, reproduced discourses of a civilising mission and of a universal humanity that could be deployed by anticolonial nationalists in other sites of empire that were never invaded to the same extent by settlers, in independence struggles from the mid-twentieth century. Finally, as Whatmore’s (2002) analysis of the Select Committee on Aborigines reveals, they provided juridical narratives that are part of the arsenal of weapons that indigenous peoples can wield in attempts to claim redress and recompense in a postcolonial world. The politics of humanism in practice, then, was riddled with contradiction, fraught with particularity and latent with varying possibilities. It could be relatively progressive and liberatory; it could be dispossessive and culturally genocidal. Within its repertoire lay potential to combat environmental and biological determinism and innatism, however, and this should not be forgotten in a rush to condemn humanism’s universalism as well as its anthropocentrism. It is in the tensions within universalism that the ongoing potential of an always provisional, self-conscious, flexible and strategic humanism – one that now recognises the continuity between the human and the non-human as well as the power-laden particularities of the male, middle class, Western human subject – resides.

#### Even if transhumanism is successful, the aff does not achieve black transhumanism- It does not change cultural or societal perspectives in or outside of debate

#### OR Transhumanism won’t work---BUT, at best, takes hundreds of years.

Fish 9 (Greg, computer science grad student and science blogger whose work appears on BusinessWeek, Discovery News and The Panda’s Thumb, and featured on Bad Astronomy, SEED, and io9. please, leave your brain where it is http://worldofweirdthings.com/2009/05/11/please-leave-your-brain-where-it-is/ [accessed 9/25/10])

A while ago, I took a look into an idea of the Technological Singularity that looks towards a future in which the human mind will reside as pure information within a complex network of computers. Since the first post on the subject, I’ve been getting a slow but steady stream of feedback from proponents who say that with enough time, we can’t discount something like this from happening or that I haven’t given a valid reason why a future technology for transferring human minds to machines won’t work. According to them, if you have a perfect, one to one transfer of the information from the brain to a computer, the human and his consciousness should all be there in an electronic format like a huge collection of files. All you’d need are the right tools for the job… The concept of machine aided immortality is one of those ideas that’s just too good to let go. I may be tempted to believe it myself as an avid reader of science fiction since childhood. But it just so happens that technology is my area of expertise and I’ve worked with computers too long not to hear alarm bells ringing when I picture mad scientists trying to replicate a brain in machine form. When Ray Kurzweil talks about melding minds with microchips, he focuses on the idea that our minds have electrical impulses like computers and our thoughts can be read with proper equipment. However, the issue is a lot more nuanced than that. Just because we can design a probe that can read electrical activity in our nervous systems and activate preprogrammed functions, doesn’t mean that we took a step towards replacing neurons with silicon. Let’s say you wanted to truly download a human mind into a mechanical vessel of some sort. To make it work, your machine would have to work the same exact way as a human brain. That’s not going to happen with just a few futuristic updates. You’d need to rethink how it works from the bottom up, starting with memory and how it uses electrical activity for its basic functions. Electrical pulses in digital equipment like computers come from transistors switched on and off as electricity from a power supply flows to them. Data generated by myriads of these pulses is then recorded to a disk in a computer’s hard drive and can be retrieved when needed with the use an index which keeps track of where on the disk the data is actually recorded. So if you needed to find a file on your computer, the device finds all the places on the hard disk where the file’s data lives and presents it in the correct form via an operating system. A human brain is very different. In the brain, those pulses come from chemical reactions between sodium and potassium. There’s no hard disk where data is stored. Instead, clusters of neurons store the data temporarily and the more you reuse the information, the stronger those connections get and the better you remember it. Another major difference is that computers have limited amounts of data storage because hard disks can fit only so much. But the brain doesn’t have a limit on the amount of information it can store. Forgetting seems to be more of a function of not using the information or being unable to effectively retain it rather than our limit on potential knowledge. Estimates of what capacity the brain has are completely meaningless because they try to apply a the constraints of an electronic system designed to have X amount of storage to a biological network that evolved over millions of years and records memories in much more sophisticated and dynamic ways. So if the Singularity proponents can overlook so basic and so important, what are we to make of the idea that human brains can actually be downloaded or merge with machinery? Well, again, there’s a lot of excitement over the fact that our nervous system generate electrical activity and carry information with pulses of ions. In a computer network, you can get the same pulses to get you the same data on a different machine. But keep in mind that there’s no hard disk to which the data gets recorded in the brain and the electrical activity is used to fire neurotransmitters rather than record files. The brain is the storage, the RAM and the operating system so trying to transfer over the signals neurons send to each other into a computer isn’t going to give you any of the information stored in the person’s mind, not to mention that all you’d be doing in interrupting pulses which will start again as soon as your futile effort is over. The neurons in our brains aren’t just transistors that send ions to each other. They’re what make us who and what we are. Human minds are a product of chemistry and organic connections, swayed by neurotransmitters and hormones, prone to emotions that were passed on from our earliest ancestors as survival mechanisms. When someone like Ray Kurzweil talks about abandoning our bodies, he’s taking his very circumstantial and drastically incomplete knowledge of both computers and human brains, and applies a hefty dose of what can only be described as a technological New Ageism. His idea is based on a typical religious model which sees our bodies as nothing more than vessels for our souls. It’s that soul, that concept of the transcendent human essence, Kurzweil wants to extract and put into a microprocessor to gain a sort of immortality. And in this case, he thinks he found the human soul in the everyday electrical activity of the brain.

#### You cannot “escape” pre-existing modes of relationality---attempts to do so re-create neoliberalism.

Love 15 – Associate Professor at the University of Pennsylvania [Heather, ““Doing Being Deviant: Deviance Studies, Description, and the Queer Ordinary,” *differences* Vol. 26, No. 1, p. 89-91]

Today, queer studies – prestigious but unevenly institutionalized – still signals absolute refusal or criticality – all anti- and no normativity. In their influential 2004 essay, “The University and the Undercommons” (and in the 2013 book that followed from it), Fred Moten and Stefano Harney rely on such an understanding of queer (as well as concepts borrowed from black studies, feminism, ethnic studies, and anticolonial thought). They call for betrayal, refusal, theft, and marronage as modes of resisting the iron grip of the academy, pointing to an uncharted, underground, and collective space they call the undercommons. “To enter this space,” they write, “is to inhabit the ruptural and enraptured disclosure of the commons that fugitive enlightenment enacts, the criminal, matricidal, queer, in the cistern, on the stroll of the stolen life, the life stolen by enlightenment and stolen back, where the commons give refuge, where the refuge gives commons” (103). Moten and Harney speculate whether the “thought of the outside” (105) is possible inside the university and suggest that if there is an outside, it is along the margins and at the bottom. Yet their imagination of that outside is indebted to the inside, in particular to the conception of deviance produced within sociology. Their account of the undercommons reads like a rap sheet, a list of the traditional topics of deviance studies: theft, homosexuality, prostitution, incarceration.

Moten and Harney do not describe the undercommons, but rather ask their readers to join it, to participate in active revolt against profes- sional and disciplinary protocols. To o er an objective account of the social position of radical academics would be to further business as usual in the academy; dwelling in the undercommons requires giving up on the usual protocols of description. Moten and Harney argue against the traditional role of the “critical academic” (105), which they see as just another turn of the professional screw, since work that opposes the academy does not challenge its basic structure or everyday operations. They argue that “to be a critical academic in the university is to be against the university, and to be against the university is always to recognize it and to be recognized by it, and to institute the negligence of the internal outside, that unassimilated underground, a negligence of it that is precisely, we must insist, the basis of the professions” (105). In contrast to the figure of the critical academic, they forward the image of the “subversive intellectual” who is “in but not of” the academy (101). Without dismissing the galvanizing effect of such a call to the undercommons, it is important to consider the limits of the refusal of objectification as a strategy. To be unlocatable, to be nowhere, to be in permanent revolt: Moten and Harney describe the path that queer inquiry laid out for itself. Objectification – recognition, description, critique – can be a way to reinforce the status quo, but it is also a way of acknowledging one’s institutional position and the real differences between inside and outside. Even the most subversive intellectuals in the academy are “on the stroll” in a metaphorical but not a material sense. The fate of those who came “under false pretenses, with bad documents, out of love” (101), if they survive, is to become “superordinates” in Becker’s sense.

Whose side are we on? Can we hold onto the critical and polemical energy of queer studies as well as its radical experiments in style and thought while acknowledging our implication in systems of power, management, and control? Will a more explicit avowal of disciplinary affiliations and methods snuff out the utopian energies of a field that sees itself as a radical outsider in the university? To date, both the political and the methodological antinormativity of queer studies have made it difficult to address our implication in the violence of knowledge production, pedagogy, and social inequality. Such violence is inevitable, and critical histories of the disciplines – and the production of knowledge about social deviance – are essential. Undertaking such work, however, will not allow escape into a radically different relation to our objects because we are (as Moten and Harney also argue) part of that history – we are its contemporary instantiation. To imagine a social world in which those relations are transformed – in what Moten and Harney refer to as the “prophetic organization” (102) – may be crucial for the achievement of social justice, but to deny our own implication in existing structures is also a form of violence.

#### The affirmative reinforces ableist notions of humanity centered on capabilities---turns the case.

Dalibert 14 (Lucie, Dissertation to obtain the degree of doctor at the University of Twente, “Posthumanism and Somatechnologies Exploring the Intimate Relations between Humans and Technologies,” 2014, Chapter Two: Human Enhancement as Normation?, <https://ris.utwente.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/6057325/thesis_L_Dalibert.pdf>, DOA: 9-19-2019) //Snowball

Furthermore, as enhancement technologies become available, what constitutes ‘species typical/normal functioning’ is likely to be reconfigured and abilities are likely to be not only differently desirable but also hierarchically valued. In fact, human enhancement and enhancement technologies might reinforce the tension between average and ideal that informs what is considered to be normal. In Linda Hogle’s words,

as a norm comes to stand for something to strive for, rather than a centered, neutral, or positive condition, the average comes to be seen as the deficient (Hogle 2005: 699).

Certain (enhanced) abilities can be expected to become the norm, and humans will become evaluated – they will count as more or less human, their life will be regarded as more or less worth living – on basis of the possession or the lack of these (enhanced) abilities (Haker 2008: 196).

Humanness – who and what counts as (putatively properly) human – is at stake within human enhancement. This becomes particularly clear when attention is drawn to the ways in which human enhancement, or rather human enhancement as it is framed by some of its proponents (be they transhumanist or not), is underpinned by and operates a devaluation of disabilities. With the intertwinement of the norm and the normal in the concept of ‘typical species functioning’ and the correlate consecration of the normate – or its technologically enhanced version the posthuMan – at the expense of putatively differently abled bodies, who tend to be regarded as always already disabled, human enhancement – as it is delineated in discussions about it – tends to become a system of normation. In fact, as it partakes in and reinstates the (ableist) ideology of disability, human enhancement becomes a highly exclusionary phenomenon. Another element contributes to this state of affairs: human enhancement is rarely, if ever, apprehended as a configuration of human-technology relations. Rather, with the normate as both baseline and horizon of human enhancement, the latter is construed as a steady improvement (see also chapter one). Dualisms pervade while the figure of the huMan/posthuMan reigns.

### 1NC- Tech Good

#### 1. Accurate predictions---the AFF causes confirmation bias

Michael D. Ward 13, Professor of Political Science at Duke University, Niles W. Metternich, University of College London, Cassy L. Dorff, Max Gallop, Florian M. Hollenbach, Anna Schultz, and Simon Weschle, "Learning from the Past and Stepping into the Future: Toward a New Generation of Conflict Prediction", International Studies Review (2013) 15, 473-490

Political events are frequently framed as unpredictable. Who could have predicted the Arab Spring, 9/11, or the end of the cold war? This skepticism about prediction reflects an underlying desire to forecast. Predicting political events is difficult because they result from complex social processes. However, in recent years, our capacity to collect information on social behavior and our ability to process large data have increased to degrees only foreseen in science fiction. This new ability to analyze and predict behavior confronts a demand for better political forecasts that may serve to inform and even help to structure effective policies in a world in which prediction in everyday life has become commonplace. Only a decade ago, scholars interested in civil wars undertook their research with constrained resources, limited data, and statistical estimation capabilities that seem underdeveloped by current standards. Still, major advances did result from these efforts. Consider “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War” by Fearon and Laitin (2003), one of the most venerated and cited articles about the onset of civil wars. Published in 2003, it has over 3,000 citations in scholar.google.com and almost 900 citations in the Web of Science (as of April 2013). It has been cited prominently in virtually every social science discipline in journals ranging from Acta Sociologica to World Politics; and it is the most downloaded article from the American Political Science Review.2 ¶ This article is rightly regarded as an important, foundational piece of scholarship. However, in the summer of 2012, it was used by Jacqueline Stevens in a New York Times Op-Ed as evidence that political scientists are bad forecasters. That claim was wildly off the mark in that Fearon and Laitin do not focus on forecasting, and Stevens ignored other, actual forecasting efforts in political science. Stevens’ point—which was taken up by the US Congress—was that government funding on quantitative approaches was being wasted on efforts that did not provide accurate policy advice. In contrast to Stevens, we argue that conflict research in political science can be substantially improved by more, not less, attention to predictions through quantitative approaches.¶ We argue that the increasing availability of disaggregated data and advanced estimation techniques are making forecasts of conflict more accurate and precise, thereby helping to evaluate the utility of different models and winnow the good from the bad. Forecasting also helps to prevent overfitting and reduces confirmation bias. As such, forecasting efforts can be used to help validate models, to gain greater confidence in the resulting estimates, and to ultimately present robust models that may allow us to improve the interaction with decision makers seeking greater clarity about the implications of potential actions.

#### 2. Peacekeeping---algorithmic governance enables effective responses to global atrocities

John Karlsrud 14, Senior Research Fellow and Manager of the Training for Peace programme at NUPI, Peacekeeping 4.0: Harnessing the Potential of Big Data, Social Media, and Cyber Technologies, in “Cyberspace and International Relations: Theory, Prospects and Challenges,” https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Hakan\_Mehmetcik/publication/285282612\_A\_New\_Way\_of\_Conducting\_War\_Cyberwar\_Is\_That\_Real/links/5c63f67d45851582c3e47db7/A-New-Way-of-Conducting-War-Cyberwar-Is-That-Real.pdf

Brought together, the data can enable international organizations to follow and possibly prevent evolving situations and crises. This potential has been recognized; and, following the financial crisis, the UN Secretary-General created UN Global Pulse to explore opportunities for using real-time data to gain a more accurate understanding of population wellbeing, especially related to the impacts of global crises. The availability of real-time data holds great promise for helping us detect the early signs of stress on vulnerable populations. It represents an unprecedented opportunity to track the human impacts of crises as they unfold, and to get real-time feedback on how well policy responses are working (UN Global Pulse 2012b). As such, research undertaken by UN Global Pulse, notably though its networks of country-level “Pulse Labs,” may give the UN a better ability to follow, respond to and mitigate the impact of natural disasters and complex crises. However, more than 90 % of the information will be unstructured, potentially rich in useful information. Turning structured and unstructured information into actionable data requires efficient ways of structuring and analyzing the information in real time in a data ecosystem (WEF 2010, p. 4). This process is often called “reality mining” (UN Global Pulse 2012a, p. 18; Eagle and Pentland 2006) or “data mining”—discovering patterns in large data sets (Cheshire 2011; Helbing and Balietti 2012). So, how can the UN and other multilateral actors make use of this data? Cooperation has been initiated with Google and other large corporations that are at the forefront in harvesting actionable data from the “data deluge” (The Economist 2010b). Concurrently with this development, the digital divide is closing at an increasing speed. According to the World Bank, 44.9 out of every 100 people in subSaharan Africa had a mobile subscription in 2010 (World Bank 2012a), and by 2016 this figure will reach 91.3 (Portio Research 2012), although the high number may mask persons have more than one subscription. The percentage of population with access to internet is also increasing (World Bank 2012b). This means that the amount of both structured and unstructured data that can be analyzed and can inform multilateral efforts for conflict prevention and international security is increasing rapidly and can give a more even and realistic picture of the situation in question. However, there is a need to be realistic. There is great variance in the access to data between countries such as Syria and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and many have more than one mobile subscription to strengthen their resilience against patchy networks. Other co-influencing factors are the rapid spread of 3G networks in developing countries and affordable smart phones at prices down to $50 or less (Jidenma 2011). There is also a current global mega-trend of access to the internet through mobile devices: “in a world where there are 6.3 bn mobile users and 2.3 bn internet users, the default access mode to broadband services is mobile” (Ulf Ewaldsson, Ericsson, quoted in ITU 2012a). According to the International Telecommunication Union, “the ubiquitous mobile phone provides an important foundation for the uptake of mobilebased Internet [in the developing world]. With the majority of countries worldwide having launched 3G mobile-broadband services, the prospects are promising” (ITU 2012b, p. 39, Evans 2012). In the areas of conflict prevention, humanitarian action, and development, the UN has made some initial steps. But what then is the situation in the areas of peacekeeping and peacebuilding? Unfortunately, little progress has been made so far. Notwithstanding the inclusion of surveillance drones in one peacekeeping mission, the development of Joint Mission Analysis Cells and Joint Operations Centres (which I will return to in the next section), the use of mobile phones in community alert networks in eastern Congo, and the heightened focus on the strategic planning and coordination capacity of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, much work remains before peacekeeping operations can be said to be tapping the potential of big data, social media, and cyber-technology effectively, entering the age of “Peacekeeping 4.0.” The good part of this story is that much work already has been undertaken in the similar and parallel fields of conflict prevention, humanitarian action and development. Many lessons from these fields could easily be imported, while other innovative approaches can be accessed through increased cooperation and coordination. Accomplishing this will require overcoming various bureaucratic hurdles and turfism, driven by support from engaged member states and the Secretary-General. Finally, the uptake of digital information in the planning of UN peace operations may also have implications for how the interaction between the UN, member states and civil society is theorized. IR theorists have increasingly underscored the importance of civil society actors as potential norm entrepreneurs (Keck and Sikkink 1998), and more recent research looking at the relationship between media and international organizations emphasize the potential role civil society and new technology can play in democratizing the access to information, but also the potential for groups spreading disinformation and incite hatred. This chapter will seek to explore what chances the availability of Big Data and new technologies offer for peacekeeping and as well as inherent challenges. The chapter proceeds as follows: First, I narrow in on some key initiatives in the areas of conflict prevention, humanitarian action, and development that can be relevant to peacekeeping. The following section provides a short background on peacekeeping and its evolution from the end of the Cold War until present, noting some of the steps taken to date. Thirdly, I discuss some of the challenges and opportunities facing policymakers, and relate these to the area of peacekeeping in particular. Finally, the chapter sums up and offers some recommendations for policymakers among member states, in the UN, and among civil society, as well as pointing out areas in need of further research, to enable the UN to enter the era of fourth generation peacekeeping—“Peacekeeping 4.0.” 2 Cyberization of Conflict Prevention, Humanitarian Action, and Development The age of Big Data and social media has dawned on the fields of humanitarian activity, social activism, and development. Here the application of big data and social media has advanced a great deal further than in the areas of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, particularly among civil society organizations (CSOs) and other independent actors. One of these initiatives is Ushahidi. Ushahidi is a “web based reporting system that utilizes crowdsourced data to formulate visual map information of a crisis on a real-time basis” (Ushahidi 2012a). Ushahidi, which means “testimony” in Swahili, was originally a website established after the election violence in Kenya in 2008 to map incidents of violence (Ushahidi 2012b). Using crowdsourcing as a method means that everyone with access to common digital communication channels can contribute data.1 The data can be provided via text messages, email, twitter and web-forms. One recent example is Syria Tracker—a website set up to monitor violent incidents involving civilians in Syria: “Syria Tracker is a crowdsourced effort developed by individuals concerned about the harm inflicted upon civilians in Syria” (Syria Tracker 2012). Ushahidi and Syria Tracker are part of a tendency of “how non-state actors are increasingly collaborating online to tackle issues traditionally managed by governments” (Leson 2012). Also in the area of monitoring and evaluation, internet platforms are being established to ease the sharing and coordination of information. One example is the ActivityInfo website established by UNICEF, OCHA, and bedatadriven; it “that helps humanitarian organizations to collect, manage, map and analyze indicators…and allow for real time monitoring of the humanitarian situation in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo” (ActivityInfo 2012). Analyzing the use of Google searches or Twitter messages can give strong indications of evolving situations, or whether an epidemic is spreading. Paul and Dredze (2011) found a very strong correlation coefficient (0.958) between tweets and official flu statistics, where the tweets were in real time and the statistics available only afterwards. Analyzing trending topics in Google searches or Facebook and blog posts can also yield significant data (Ginsberg et al. 2009). Google Dengue Trends uses aggregated Google search data to estimate dengue activity (Google 2012a); there is a similar service for influenza (Google 2012b). Following the earthquake in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, researchers from Sweden’s Karolinska Institutet and Columbia University in New York used mobile phone data, tracking 1.9 million SIM cards (Bengtsson et al. 2011, p. 2). They were able to follow the population flows and destinations of 648,717 people who had been displaced (ibid.:3). Later that year, the same team followed population movement after a cholera outbreak (Bengtsson et al. 2010, p. 2). Multilateral actors have started to catch on. The UN Secretary-General has created UN Global Pulse; the World Bank has begun discussing how big data can be used for development (World Bank 2012c), and has established “Mapping for Results” to visualize and track its programs and projects on the ground (World Bank 2012d). However, much remains to be done. In 2009, the UN Global Pulse Initiative launched the Rapid Impact and Vulnerability Analysis Fund (RIVAF). However, a recent report published by the initiative reveals a focus on the use of traditional indicators, and a lack of focus on conflict and post-conflict countries, even though many of the UN agencies, funds, and programs involved in the RIVAF initiative operate in precisely such locations (UN Global Pulse 2011). Further work is necessary in this area, also to focus the energies of developmentoriented organizations to conflict and post-conflict countries and utilize the potential offered by big data, social media, and cyber-technology. The UN has engaged with the Crisis Mappers community since 2010 (UN 2012a, p. 4, Crisis Mappers 2012); among other things, the Standby Task Force has supported OCHA crowdsourcing data for South Sudan, collecting “a total of 1,767 unique rows of data and 15,271 unique pieces of information records” in a mere 3 days (Standby Task Force 2012). At a recent meeting in New York to discuss the status of implementation of the UN’s Crisis Information Strategy, it was agreed that there is a need for Crisis Information Managers, and that the efforts towards convergence in crisis information management could support the “endeavours of ‘One UN’ and better coordination within the UN and the international community in general” (Swiss Mission to the United Nations 2012). A Crisis Management Training Course has since been established, with the first course being given in February 2013 at the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) in Nairobi, Kenya. The course will train civilians, military and police “working in multidimensional peace and humanitarian operations … to integrate new information technology into an information management system [and] demonstrate the opportunities and challenges of new ICTs [Information and Communication Technology] and social media tools…” (ICT4Peace 2012a). The challenge now will be to get the UN onboard and send staff to these courses, providing the organization with staff trained personnel that can enable it to make use of Big Data, ICTs and social media in its operations. The UN in Sudan has taken one step in this direction. With support of the United Kingdom, UNDP has run a Crisis Recovery and Mapping Analysis project since 2007 (UNDP 2012a), aimed at supporting both the UN country team (UNCT) and national authorities in making their activities more evidence-based and conflict-responsive (see also Bott and Young 2012).2 In Georgia, the Caucasus Research Resource Centers and Saferworld have joined forces with developers to produce Elva, combining “the data-rich mapping of Ushahidi with the meticulous requirements of human-rights researchers” (Sifry 2012). The platform is used to create a community safety network where a community representative, using SMS, can report violent or security incidents on a weekly basis. A similar initiative was developed by Columbia University in connection with the Voix des Kivus program in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to “overcome the problems associated with the collection of conflict data” (van der Wind and Humphreys 2012). It involved distributing prepaid cellphones, solar chargers, and code sheets to community representatives in 18 villages in Eastern Congo (ibid.). For both projects, protecting the identity of those reporting against possible reprisals became an important concern (ibid., p. 24; see also Puig 2012). Together with the crisis mapping community, OCHA is experimenting with developing twitter dashboards for humanitarian crises. These use “Machine Learning (ML) techniques and social computing methods… to extract relevant information from twitter and aggregate this information according to Cluster for analytical purposes” (Meier 2012). A similar dashboard for peacekeeping operations “that looks across social media content and perhaps uses corporate data” could be envisaged (Interview with Meier 2012).

#### 3. There’s no risk of errors---even if AI isn’t perfect, it’s great at admitting what it doesn’t know---human error is orders of magnitude worse

Patrick Tucker 20 {Patrick Tucker is technology editor for Defense One. 4-29-2020. “Artificial Intelligence Outperforms Human Intel Analysts In a Key Area.” https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2020/04/artificial-intelligence-outperforms-human-intel-analysts-one-key-area/165022/}//JM

In the 1983 movie WarGames, the world is brought to the edge of nuclear destruction when a military computer using artificial intelligence interprets false data as an imminent Soviet missile strike. Its human overseers in the Defense Department, unsure whether the data is real, can’t convince the AI that it may be wrong. A recent finding from the Defense Intelligence Agency, or DIA, suggests that in a real situation where humans and AI were looking at enemy activity, those positions would be reversed. Artificial intelligence can actually be more cautious than humans about its conclusions in situations when data is limited. While the results are preliminary, they offer an important glimpse into how humans and AI will complement one another in critical national security fields. DIA analyzes activity from militaries around the globe. Terry Busch, the technical director for the agency’s Machine-Assisted Analytic Rapid-Repository System, or MARS, on Monday joined a Defense One viewcast to discuss the agency’s efforts to incorporate AI into analysis and decision-making. Earlier this year, Busch's team set up a test between a human and AI. The first part was simple enough: use available data to determine whether a particular ship was in U.S. waters. “Four analysts came up with four methodologies; and the machine came up with two different methodologies and that was cool. They all agreed that this particular ship was in the United States,” he said. So far, so good. Humans and machines using available data can reach similar conclusions. The second phase of the experiment tested something different: conviction. Would humans and machines be equally certain in their conclusions if less data were available? The experimenters severed the connection to the Automatic Identification System, or AIS, which tracks ships worldwide. “It’s pretty easy to find something if you have the AIS feed, because that’s going to tell you exactly where a ship is located in the world. If we took that away, how does that change confidence and do the machine and the humans get to the same end state?” In theory, with less data, the human analyst should be less certain in their conclusions, like the characters in WarGames. After all, humans understand nuance and can conceptualize a wide variety of outcomes. The researchers found the opposite. “Once we began to take away sources, everyone was left with the same source material — which was numerous reports, generally social media, open source kinds of things, or references to the ship being in the United States — so everyone had access to the same data. The difference was that the machine, and those responsible for doing the machine learning, took far less risk — in confidence — than the humans did,” he said. “The machine actually does a better job of lowering its confidence than the humans do….There’s a little bit of humor in that because the machine still thinks they’re pretty right.” The experiment provides a snapshot of how humans and AI will team for important analytical tasks. But it also reveals how human judgement has limits when pride is involved. Humans, particularly experts in specific fields, have a tendency to overestimate their ability to correctly infer outcomes when given limited data. Nobel-prize winning economist and psychologist Daniel Kahneman has written on the subject extensively. Kahneman describes this tendency as the “inside view.” He cites the experience of a group of Israeli educators assigned to write a new textbook for the Ministry of Education. They anticipated that it would take them a fraction of the amount of time they knew it would take another similar team. They couldn’t explain why they were overconfident; they just were. Overconfidence is human and a particular trait among highly functioning expert humans, one that machines don’t necessarily share.

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### 2NC- TVA

#### TVA: Plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase prohibitions on private sector conduct related to firm exemption and co-ordination rights and algorithmic monopolization.

#### Solves capitalism and allows for discussions of racialized capitalism

Marshall Steinbaum et al 20, Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Utah, Left Anchor, podcast episode 155: “Socialism vs. Antitrust with Marshall Steinbaum,” 9/12/20, transcribed by Otter, https://leftanchor.podbean.com/e/episode-155-socialism-vs-antitrust-with-marshall-steinbaum/

Marshall Steinbaum 31:39 But yeah, I mean, there's a kind of what you were saying, I definitely agree with that, I guess I would push back a little bit on the kind of interpretation of the states moving away. And so like, the only thing that matters is what whether Tim Cook allows Uber to make a living, as opposed to whether, you know, the taxing authorities of every city and their state labor departments and the FTC FTC have a say on it. Like they're, they're, you know, small potatoes in comparison to the CEO of some company. I think I mean, that's true about, you know, who wields power in the economy. But it's not right to say that that's because the state has retreated and sort of ceded all control to, to the capitalist, I think we have to understand the state's involvement or policies involvement as being, you know, kind of inescapable. So the question is like, okay, so you've got, you know, like, incorporation statutes, like who's allowed to be a company to enjoy limited liability or whatever, like, people don't think of that as being part of economic policy. But it absolutely is not just, you know, is Apple allowed to be a corporation or not a corporation as, as you know, say it's a California Corporation? I mean, it's probably a Delaware Corporation, but whatever, you know, can it operate across state lines? You know, these were big issues in the 19th century. Nowadays, we get things like, oh, if you're a corporation, then basically anything you want to do is legal under the antitrust laws, you know, but people who are not corporations cannot act together under the antitrust laws. So for example, you know, you're talking about like, oh, Uber could be liable under antitrust for this gigantic price fixing conspiracy. Through, executed through verticals restraints, yes. You know, who has actually been found to be liable under the antitrust laws? Uber drivers for potentially collectively bargaining their wages against Uber. So that it's this idea that like, Oh, you know, these individual drivers, like they're independent businesses operating on this neutral platform, but they can't get together. That's what the antitrust laws forbid. Whereas this one gigantic corporation that dominates them that is absolutely allowed to do whatever it wants. So this is the kind of concept that my my colleague and collaborator Sanjukta Paul is called the allocator, antitrust is an allocator of coordination rights and the title of her paper. This idea is like, who's allowed to coordinate economic activity? Is it it, and what she says is that antitrust has what's called the firm exemption. So here she's drawing on what what, you know, most every antitrust person recognizes and is known in the jurisprudence is the labor exemption, which is that labor unions bargaining wages within a recognized bargaining framework cannot violate the antitrust law through that collective bargaining. So that the idea is that's an exemption to antitrust's usual, preference for competition. What she says is, you know, we have to reinterpret that as being, as there being a firm exemption to antitrust, which is Uber telling everybody what to do, that has an exemption from antitrust law by virtue of the fact that Uber is a corporation and or the way that we have chosen to allocate coordination rights in her framework is to allow Uber to coordinate entire markets in the case of Apple to allow Apple to determine what is presented on its on its app store and you know, it has, you know, pretty, you know, strong representation in the retail smartphone market. So it's like okay, you know, Uber is probably going for relative upscale clientele, they all have iPhones, if it can't get on the iPad, if it can't get on the App Store can't get on the iPhone. And if you can't get on the iPhone, they have no business. You know, that is the allocation of coordination rights over that market to Apple, as opposed to some other mechanism for allocating coordination rights. And this is where, you know, to get back to what we were talking about earlier, anti monopolist framework would say, you know, there's no reason why Apple gets to be the one who decides who sees what, why don't we potentially, you know, in a kind of Co Op context, give, give that right to, you know, a consortium or, you know, quote unquote, union of app developers, or in the case of, say, ride sharing, like, why don't we have a union of taxi drivers, and they determine, you know, who gets who gets matched with which customer and what the fare is, as opposed to the company determining thatAlexi 35:48 this is so important, and I think it's really worth emphasizing, you know, the point about how jurisprudence and an antitrust enforcement does what she said, and so far as it, it chooses sides, and who can coordinate these things and who's autonomous and who has power. And since we're speaking of Apple, maybe you can talk a bit about how sanitation workers right at Kodak, Kodak back in the 80s had more power to coordinate and kind of exert their their power over sanitation workers at Apple, right in contemporary times, and then you write about how that is kind of an example of, you know, how the separation of workers from lead firms is kind of a simultaneous erosion of the in the jurisprudence of the Sherman act prohibitions on vertical restraints. So, yeah, maybe talk even a bit more about about the importance of this. Marshall Steinbaum 36:40 Yeah, so that's getting to what a great economist David Weil has called the fissured workplace. And I think you're referring specifically to a article that was published, I think, by Neil Irwin, if I recall, correctly, in the New York Times, a couple years ago, that was profiling two specific people, one of whom had been kind of janitorial worker on payroll at Kodak in the early 80s. And like, she had basically benefited from their, you know, corporate policies that included incentives to like go to community college and get credentials. And so she got qualified as I you know, sort of IT person, she was like, trained on Lotus 123, or something from the, you know, from the dark history of personal computing. You know, she kind of worked her way up through the ranks at Kodak, thanks to the fact that she started in the ranks of Kodak that is that she was a janitorial worker on the payroll, she was able to be promoted, basically, to the point of being the head of it for the entire company at some at one point. So she was a senior executive, you know, and that kind of social mobility via the mechanism of a major economy leading firm that employs people kind of every stratum of the occupational hierarchy of the income hierarchy, and is itself a like, somewhat egalitarian organization in its own right. I mean, insofar as any corporation could be egalitarian within capitalism, you know, I think this is kind of what Wynand was talking about, when he referred to, you know, this sort of New Deal state that was created by the National Labor Relations Act and other other, you know, kind of New Deal reforms, it's like that, that kind of somewhat egalitarian corporate organization is, you know, a thing of the past. And my argument would be well, it's and it's the erosion of antitrust that made that not the case. So in the instance of Apple, the contrary, the contrasting individual was, you know, janitorial services worker who was contracted, so she was employed by some, you know, janitorial services contractor whom Apple contracted with to clean its offices, but like, there's no way that she's ever going to be promoted to be an employee of Apple, let alone a senior executive at Apple, you know, nowadays, Apple is one of the economies leading firms. So there's different, you know, just, you know, take and both firms are like, somewhat are considered somewhat technologically innovative in their time. So like, think of these, you know, kind of economy leading like blue chip companies that are that like defined the apex of the American economy in two different eras. One of them is constructed such that it's possible for a janitor to eventually become a senior executive, the other is constructed so as to make that impossible at all costs. And and and, you know, I think Irwin's piece gets exactly at this question of employment classification as being a crucial constituent of that changing reality. I would say that the ability to contract everything out and yet control everything so minutely use a, you know, arms legally at arm's length, but like economically, you know, at a very close distance and with total control to the boss, you know, that is we have to understand the erosion of antitrust is being just as much a part of that as the non enforcement of labor laws, the erosion of of enforcement of those and so on. Ryan Cooper 39:59 Yeah, Yeah, that's that's a great dichotomy. I wanted to also, I wanted to bring up the the welfare state. I n, in, in a couple of these articles, you've mentioned how, you know, the gig economy and various sort of like, anti trust, you know, trying to escape any kind of liability for, for being responsible for one's, you know, employees has materially harmed workers by sort of excluding them from, you know, like traditional welfare state stuff, which is often administered through, you know, through the employment relation. But you've you've also written about how, like the cares act, part, partly helped with that, and then partly maybe, sort of entrenched the bad relationship. But, you know, in general, the cares act was like a pretty astounding piece. I mean, it's seems mostly expired now. But, like, it was a really interesting piece of legislative legislation that, that helped people out a lot and kind of revealed a lot of underlying, you know, deficiencies in the way that people in DC have done policy for the last like, 40 years. So can you can you kind of go through, like, the how the welfare state interacts with, you know, anti trust, and and, you know, kind of kind of how the two can can complement each other? And how they that might be fixed? Marshall Steinbaum 41:41 Yeah, absolutely. So,we've been talking a lot about this question of the legal employment relationship, and why that matters so much for workers. And a big reason why it matters so much is exactly as you said, that so much of our welfare state is conditioned on employment. And so that's what you know. So in some sense, this like category, that's kind of, you know, not the main focus of attention at the time of the New Deal. You're that this distinction, the question of like employment independent contractor, and that is an important distinction, as I was referring to in the antitrust cases that we talked about earlier. But like, this idea that, you know, a lot matters for you economically, on the question of whether you are legally an employee or not, that's not true to the New Deal era, per se, it's that's what's been layered on since and especially since we kind of adopted the backlash to the Great Society view that the problem with the welfare state is that it causes people not to work and inculcates a culture of poverty. You know, all of that is basically racist drivel. But it's had an enormous impact on the kind of Orthodoxy around welfare policy, especially in DC. So as I've talked about, either of I've talked about in this podcast, certainly a couple of times on podcasts with bruenig. And in some other writings, you know, there's this sort of mania for the Earned Income Tax Credit among DC policy wonk types, which is this, basically wage subsidy for people who were employed in market labor, and it doesn't help you if you're not employed in market labor, and arguably, it hurts you, even if you are employed to market labor, and you don't receive it, because it by causing people to, you know, as sort of have to be employed to market labor in order to gain the benefit and arguably depresses wages for people who aren't beneficiaries, so reduces the market wage, basically. You know, that cares act is kind of by chance, the opposite of that. So first of all, you said that the cares act was like this revolutionary thing. It was that with respect to that unemployment insurance position, provision, so called pandemic unemployment compensation, and then pandemic unemployment assistance, we'll get to what those two things are in a second, the rest of the cares act for you know, it also included a, you know, sort of like one off $1200 check from the IRS, you know, for people earning about, I guess, it was like below 100,000 a year. And then there was like, a ton of stuff that was basically an indefinite extension of a whole, like firehose of money to, you know, the economy's leading corporations via the Federal Reserve and the Treasury. But I think, especially the Federal Reserve, so you're saying it's, like, mostly expired now? Well, not the part that gave capital, everything they want it that part's not expired, and that's exactly why the other part hasn't been renewed. So there was a sense, you know, the kind of political calculus that gave rise to the cares act is like, you know, we have like, suddenly a pandemic has hit the economy, it's going to be temporary, you know, so we need to, like, we need something to tie people over, let's juice up the unemployment insurance system, give people $1200 checks. And make sure all these businesses are able to borrow, you know, that are facing, you know, huge sudden shortfalls. It's like, oh, but you know, by the way, the last of those things that will be permanent, the first of those things will be temporary, because the pandemic is assumed to be temporary, and oh, wait, the pandemic is not temporary, or at least it's less temporary than we thought it was gonna be. You know, those people are suddenly high and dry because capitalists already got everything they wanted. So it's like we're in a pretty shitty situation, frankly, visa for pretty much all working people, but the stock market's doing great. Okay, so what did the cares act have for unemployment insurance? And why is that such a challenge to kind of policy received wisdom, it basically added this lump. So the PUC part, pandemic unemployment compensation added a lump sum $600 per week, on to traditionally eligible workers for unemployment. So that's PUC so if you're eligible for unemployment, there's some state formula that says that's a function of what your wages were pre layoff. You know, generally as as the lingo and unemployment insurance is replacement rates, so it's how much of your loss of your lost wages are, quote, replaced by unemployment insurance, you know, the average in the United States for people who are eligible is something like 50%. And like 50% of unemployed people aren't eligible or was not able to collect it, you know, very, like leaky sieve type system, that P You see, element of the cares act up to that number by whatever the replacement rate was under state law plus $600, which for a lot of workers is basically, you know, a gigantic windfall relative to the shittiness of the jobs that they actually have to do. So many workers, especially in low wage occupations experienced, you know, better pay when they were receiving the PVC than they did in their jobs and that they're ever likely to get in their jobs. PUA was the version of that for the gig economy. Basically, it was for workers who were not eligible for traditional unemployment insurance. And many gig economy workers were dis employed by the pandemic, this was a fully federal system that essentially gave them access to a temporary pool of unemployment insurance. And the key thing there is at the time, I wrote a letter with Sen. jepto, whom I mentioned earlier, I wrote a letter to Congress about that they have basically done a kind of ex post bailout of the of all of the misclassification that gig economy firms have been doing for a decade now. Because they're saying, Oh, you know, Uber has never paid a dime in unemployment insurance premiums for its workers, and they become unemployed all the time. Suddenly, in this pandemic, many of those workers are eligible for unemployment insurance, thanks to PUA. So that's great that they're, you know, able to subsist, but instead of paying into it, you know, Uber gets to skate for 10 years on its premiums, and then the federal government pays for that. So that was, you know, kind of, you know, a, under the radar screen bailout of the gig economy, employers. Anyway, now, you know, we're in this position where these things have been taken away, and what that has meant, you know, so the interesting thing that's come out in the economics research about the effect of the cares act, and specifically these UI provisions, is that, you know, that pandemic is and has been devastating to the low wage workforce, huge, extreme spike in unemployment, it's still very high, you know, a lot of service workers have been disappointed. But actually poverty rates went down, and earnings went up, or income went up, because their income was more than replaced by these temporary, generous provisions that were not conditional on showing up for work, because they couldn't be conditional on showing up for work, the whole point of the pandemic is that people can do their work, you know, now, you know, and, you know, given that like that, like, in the midst of an economic catastrophe, we reduce the poverty rate, you know, that like flies in the face of everything that we know about how the poverty, you know, the poverty rate usually goes up when there's an economic recession. And what we just found out is like, if you don't want that to happen, if you do want to reduce poverty, you have to enact these policies that aren't conditional on work. That's how you reduce policy, you give people money, basically, and in this case, unemployed people are the people who are likely to be dev low income to be in poverty. So that's how you get money to. So now, you know, we're kind of I mean, because of this political misjudgment that had, you know, given capital, everything and wanted while workers bailouts was temporary, you know, now it's like, Okay, well, like, please give us something for workers. You know, I think the the view had been that, like the election would be the leverage that, you know, pro worker interests would have over the federal political system, but that's not the case, actually, because the outcomes of elections aren't terribly responsive to the the well being of the population, which is a big problem that we should probably do something about at some point. But But, you know, so now it's like, Okay, well, we're sort of like pleading for scraps the way that we have been for the last decades, and everyone's reverted to, you know, basically versions of the EITC expansions that have been on their, you know, to do list for for a long time. So it's like, okay, you know, the wanks have guy kind of gotten back control in control of the message and the asks and whatever. And, you know, consequently, the agenda has gotten shittier. Alexi 49:39 never a good idea to give the Wong's power. But now, like so far, I just want to recap for the audience. We have number one left anchor Steinbaum, synthesis of anti trust and democratic socialism, to new idea breaking news, let's make government responsive to the needs of the people. That's that's that's what we've so these two important things that we're offering now. But But no, I think first of all the point point very well taken that, you know, our favorite game about the Democrats, is it malfeasance and or is it malice? You know, is it is it just, you know, bad politics or or is it just intentional, you know, slap in the face to the working people of this country into the poor. So, so yeah, yeah, point point well taken that the the corporations were given a, you know, indefinite Lifeline, and then I think they accidentally helped the poor and helped the working class, probably because they didn't realize how low pain, you know, jobs were out there. Yeah. Marshall Steinbaum 50:39 Yeah. I mean, that's exactly right. It was pretty clear at the time that like, there was just sort of No, I mean, I think the rhetoric in Washington is like, somewhat responsive to, you know, insofar as there's any responsiveness to workers, it's like, you know, people who are not precariously employed. So, you know, that I, you know, so it's like they don't it's like any job is a good job, or they are not, that's a little bit of an overstatement. But it's like, you know, what we want to prevent as people losing their jobs, as long as they have their a job, there'll be fine. And, you know, there's just a very, very little apprehension on the part of like, the policy elite of like, just how bad most jobs Alexi 51:18 but look, Marshall, we all know, worst case scenario, as Mitt Romney said back in the day, if you're really in a tough situation, just sell your stocks if you have to just Marshall Steinbaum 51:28 Yes, yeah, yeah, right. Right. Just that Yeah, Dad stock at American Motors or whatever, you know, what you can afford? Right? I Ryan Cooper 51:33 mean, it was a tough thing to have to do. But sometimes you got to just bootstrap it. Marshall Steinbaum 51:40 Yeah, so well, you know, now now, Romney is a resistance hero. He's doing everything he can to bring our Trump Reign of Terror to an end Ryan Cooper 51:47 he is, thank thank God for him, honestly. Yeah, so so to, I guess, to kind of like, like, tie a tie that together a little bit. You know, like, the welfare state is, you know, just like a critical lifeline. You know, like the cares act shows, you know, that, that, that four decades of neoliberalism was all bullshit, actually, we could solve poverty quickly and easily, just by, you know, dumping money on people who don't have money. That's literally It's that easy. But I think, you know, the interesting thing to me about, like, this whole discussion about, like market regulation, and so on and so forth, is that, like, I'm pretty convinced that the, you know, in so far as your, the economy is based to some degree around, you know, private businesses, you know, doing their thing, competition is a is a fairly useful tool, if it's done, right. And that means competition, that's that that happens, you know, through a sort of regulated process, because you can have competition that just means trying to cheat, and like drive the other guy out of business, so you can seize more market share, you know, try and try to force companies to compete on price and quality. And that means big government, basically. You know, an example I've seen recently, you know, the computer chip market for for like desktop PCs. That's like a pretty concentrated market. But there is competition there between AMD and Intel. And Intel's had like a big chunk of you know, the marketplace for for many years, AMD has been sort of a laggard for the last couple years AMD like they basically just beat Intel, it's better, better chips for cheaper. And suddenly Intel's on the backfoot. And they're doing all this stuff, they're retooling their, their machine to try to sort of, like, exceed, and like, that, I think is a reasonable process, so long as it's not, you know, like, you don't you don't end up with competition that takes place like, okay, we're shipping all of our, you know, all of our factories to Tanzania, and we're just gonna pay everyone $1 you know, make them buy all their stuff in company script, that kind of competition. But, you know, and then also, you could, you could say, like, oh, we're going to set up something like the post office as explicitly a monopoly, but it's going to be a monopoly with a sort of government policy purpose, like everybody has to get the same service for the same price even if it's like ridiculously uneconomical to provide it in a certain location. And that's like a kind of different that's like about quality government and how do you set up a agency with some sort of a spirit a core that like, does a good job. But like, I think the, you know, my sort of like fundamental takeaway, and maybe you can sort of quibble with this or qualify, Marshall is that like, like, the anti trust, and, you know, breaking up, like, like full on monopolies and like forcing the businesses to compete decently and, you know, the sort of like welfare state, you know, social democratic vision, these things like there are two, they can be two great tastes that taste great together. And, you know, like, there's not necessarily a trade off. And then like, one could sort of enable the other. What do you think? Marshall Steinbaum 55:40 Yeah, I mean, I think that you can have a, you know, what might be called Race to the Top type of competition, I'm not exactly sure what's going on in the, you know, desktop computer chip market, but like, branding, what you the way you characterized it, or you can have race to the bottom competition, which is basically about sort of chiseling out your company's own regulatory arbitrage, or like, You're the one who gets to run the taxi company, but not actually charge the regulated rate, or you're the one who locates the factory in Tanzania so that you can pollute all you want and pay your workers like crap. And then you know, then you're in, you know, quote, unquote, competition with domestic producers, you know, who are then obviously incentivized to do the same themselves, I have tended to move away from the concept of competition, exactly, in some ways, exactly. For the reason that you're saying it. And for the reasons I just said, which is that it is not, it doesn't really work as like, we want more of it, or we want less of it, because there's different forms of it, as we were just saying, Yeah, and, you know, in particular, I have moved away from that concept of competition vis a vis antitrust law, like I just don't agree, now, now I have come to the view that I don't agree that the purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote competition. I think it is because, you know, for the reasons like that the world in which, you know, a US domestic manufacturer relocates overseas to take advantage of poor environmental and labor standards, you know, that's like, an act, you know, that could be understood as an anti competitive act vis a vis the workers, but like a pro competitive act vis a vis competitors, potentially. And so I don't think like it's, you know, a policy regime that gives workers that gives companies the ability to undercut their own workers through the threat of outsourcing isn't about promoting competition or repeating competition, it's about, you know, who gets to decide and the economy who has power, as Sanjukta said, who, to whom are coordination rights granted. And so my view is like, antitrust has one disposition of the allocation of coordination rights or, you know, who gets to operate as a monopoly or as a dominant firm versus who is subjected to their domination, which is designed subjected to competition under the current way of doing things that would be workers, so like, a dominant employer, you know, subjects workers to competition, so the workers have plenty of competition, and that's what reduces their labor standards. And I think that is exactly what is kind of tripped up or created this false dichotomy between like, anti monopoly ism versus socialism, because from a workers perspective, more competition is bad. Because they, you know, that's exactly what the economy already consists of, whereas from a, you know, sort of corporate perspective, you know, exactly what characterizes the economy is a lack of competition, that is to say, you know, dominance, not just in any one market, you know, where, you know, many major industries are basically, you know, an oligopoly if not a monopoly, and then, you know, vertical integration and vertical control, you know, that subjects, disadvantage actors to competitive forces and insulates powerful actors from those competitive forces. And what we want is the erosion of the concentration of power, which is to say, to, at least, you know, through the mechanism of competition that would be to subject powerful actors to competitive forces and protect unpowerful actors from them. Ryan Cooper 59:00 Well, well said. Go ahead. I was gonna just do a just out of left field kind of question about, because it seems like non domination seems to be the maybe the principle that would kind of work through the synthesis of democratic socialism and the antitrust, kind of coalitional movement. And what do you think? How would you understand that principle, working with other ideas that the left is is kind of fighting over whether it's job guarantee or UBI? You know, how do you think this overall leftist synthesis should think through what principles can help us kind of navigate these contests or which policies to to kind of fight over and propose as the most important to push for? Marshall Steinbaum 59:48 Yeah, well, I absolutely do think that non domination is the principle that's at play here. And that's why I support both UBI a job guarantee and I don't believe that there needs to be a clash between those two things. I mean, I have often thought and if I, you know, had a vast research budget of my command, I would indeed, commission this, you know that there should be a sort of left pro labor like pro low wage labor agenda that consists of a UBI, like the cares act, except not just for unemployed people, but including them, a job guarantee, which is to save full employment, you know, macroeconomic commitment to full employment, and a $15, minimum wage, as well as the enforcement of other labor standards, like maximum hours, and, you know, safe workplaces and that sort of thing. All of those things together to me form like the tripartite are the three legs of the stool of like a, you know, pro labor left agenda as against the EITC. And basically anything that's conditional on supply, market labor for in order to receive benefits. So like all three of the things I mentioned, what characterizes them is rights, and entitlements accruing to the worker that's independent of any one employer. And that's all of that is at odds with existing policy orthodoxy, for example, the EITC, the other thing that I have written about a great deal is a student debt and labor market credential is Asian. So I interpret the rise of student debt as being basically the federal government's most ambitious labor market policy of the last few decades, which is the idea that like, oh, if people are earning enough in the labor market, they need more human capital, so they need more higher education, and we'll lend them the money to get that higher education, and then their earnings will go up, like that has, you know, kind of spiraled out of control, because people's earnings haven't gone up. So they're left with a bigger pile of debt than they would have had otherwise, and consequently, aren't paying it off. But like, all the real big reason why the whole, like student debt and Higher Education and Human Capital approach to labor market policy hasn't worked, it's because it also doesn't take into account employer power and the domination, that bosses are able to exercise over workers in a capitalist economy. So what the effect of that, you know, student debt thing in the labor market has been to basically shift the cost of training or being trained for your job or qualified for your job to individuals from employers or from, you know, the public higher education system, you know, these, this is just the transfer of those costs to the shoulders of the agent that's like least able to shoulder them.

#### Governmentality and taking down problematic networks is possible

Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing 16. Professor of Social Science @ NORD, PhD & DSc in Public Administration. Professor @ Roskilde School of Governance, PhD in Political Science. 4-6-2016. “Metagoverning Collaborative Innovation in Governance Networks.” *The American Review of Public Administration*. Vol 47. Issue 7. Sage Journals. pacc

Governance Networks as Arenas for Collaborative Policy Innovation

The myth of a dynamic and innovative private sector and an ossified and change resistant public sector is dispelled by the many spectacular examples of public innovations such as the introduction of active employment policy, recycling of garbage, one-stop shops, online education, and telemedicine. Even in the technical field, the invention of the Internet, Global Positioning System (GPS), and drones bears witness to the innovativeness of the public sector (Mazzucato, 2013). Unfortunately, public innovation tends to be episodic and accidental and thus fails to enhance the future capacity for innovation (Eggers & Singh, 2009). One way of turning public innovation into a more permanent and systematic endeavor is to institutionalize arenas where collaborative innovation can take place. A burgeoning literature points to the formation of governance networks as a way of facilitating and spurring collaboration between relevant and affected actors from the public, for-profit, and non-profit sectors (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Kickert, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 1997; Scharpf, 1994). A governance network may be defined as a horizontal institutionalization of the interaction of interdependent but operationally autonomous actors who collaborate in a shared effort to define and create public value through a process of regulated self-regulation (Sorensen & Torfing, 2007). The specific strength of governance networks compared with other institutional forms of governance, such as hierarchies and markets, is that they aim to mobilize and exploit the self-governing capacity of public and private stakeholders within boundaries defined, more often than not, by government actors. Hence, governments can share the governing responsibility with external actors who can bring new ideas, competences, and resources to the table.

Governance theorists agree, however, that governance networks are not always successful in contributing to public value production, either because they fail to include the relevant and affected actors, because the tasks and goals are too vague or ill-defined, because cultural differences or conflicts of interest prevent resource exchange, or because there is a misalignment between the strategy pursued by the network and the overall strategy of government. Research demonstrates that there is a tendency toward homophily in networks that is not conducive to the broad inclusion of relevant and affected actors (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). Other studies shows that network collaboration is sometimes hampered by internal conflicts, low levels of trust, and an inability to communicate constructively about ends and means (Faerman, McCaffrey, & Slyke, 2001). Governance networks may also sometimes pursue dark and illegitimate agendas and strategies, or formulate skewed interpretations of public value that conceal the real pursuit of private interests (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; Milward & Raab, 2007).

In recognition of the possibility of governance network failure, governance researchers have developed the term "metagovernance" to describe the ways in which public authorities and other central, capable, and legitimate actors can govern governance networks without reverting too much to traditional forms of command and control (Sorensen & Torfing, 2009). As such, meta-governance refers to a specific kind of second- and third-order governance that aims to improve the functioning and capacity of relatively self-governing networks to produce governance solutions that enhance the production of public value (Jessop, 2002; Kooiman, 2003; Torfing et al., 2012). The concept of "metagovernance" shares its concern for how to influence the performance of networks with the concept of "network management" that has been developed by both European (Kickert et al., 1997; Theisman, Burren, & Gerrits, 2009) and North American scholars (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Milward & Provan, 2006; Provan & Kenis, 2008). However, whereas the network management literature is primarily interested in how public managers can get things done by creating well-functioning networks, the metagovernance literature combines the focus on network management with a broader political steering perspective concerned with the question of when and how networks can contribute to interest-mediation and the achievement of overall political goals (Peters, 2010; Sorensen & Torfing, 2016).

The challenge for public metagovernors such as elected politicians, public managers, or other actors with a delegated authority is to influence the network, while recognizing that it needs a certain degree of autonomy to define its purpose and objectives, its modus operandi, and the outputs and outcomes it aims to produce. Without this autonomy, the participating actors will tend to lose their incentive and motivation to participate in joint problem-solving. Governance theorists list a number of ways in which public authorities can metagovern governance networks. The tools of metagovernance can be divided into four main categories: (a) political, discursive, and financial framing that aims to define the basic task of the network and the conditions for solving it by defining the overall objectives, crafting a particular narrative, or encouraging governance networks to pursue particular strategies through the allocation of financial resources and other privileges; (b) institutional design that aims to create formal or informal arenas for interaction between a particular group of actors and define the basic rules of engagement; (c) network facilitation that aims to support and nurture a constructive management of difference through different kinds of process management by lowering the transaction costs of interacting, mediating conflicts, and supporting mutual learning processes; and (d) network participation that aims to influence the joint production of outputs and outcomes by aligning the goals of the actors and defining decision-making criteria.

These four metagovernance tools should be viewed as complementary rather than as mutually exclusive. Hands-off forms of metagovernance via framing and design of networks can benefit from hands-on metagovernance through facilitation of and participation in networks. By the same token, hands-on forms of metagovernance rarely function well if they are not underpinned by hands-off forms of governance. The metagovernance of governance networks is a complex and difficult endeavor that can easily go awry. The key challenge for metagovernors is to avoid regulating the governance networks too much or too little (Sorensen & Torfing, 2009). If, on one hand, governance networks are metagoverned too tightly, the network actors lose their motivation to participate in self-regulated interaction. On the other hand, too little or too weak metagovernance can result in a destructive discrepancy between the strategy pursued by the governance network and the goals pursued by public authorities. Whether or not governance networks become a positive governance tool depends, to a large extent, on to what extent metagovernors find the right level of interference in the governance network. It also depends, as we will argue, on whether the chosen metagovernance strategy fits the purpose assigned to the governance network.

# 1NR

## Case

### 1NR---Lester

#### Look before you leap – a radical departure from the legacy of humanism risks an eager embrace of totalitarian violence.

Condit 15 ― Celeste Condit, Distinguished Research Professor in the Department of Communication Studies at the University of Georgia, National Communication Association Distinguished Scholar, Ph.D. from the University of Iowa, 2015. (“Multi-Layered Trajectories for Academic Contributions to Social Change”, *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, Vol. 101, No. 1, February 4th, 2015, Available Online at: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00335630.2015.995436?needAccess=true> Accessed 9-8-17)

The Insufficiencies of Twentieth-Century Critical Theories of Social Change The theories of social change that dominated American Communication Studies at the close of the twentieth century echoed those of the Western humanities. These theories spurred extensive thought about the performances of individual identity and the relationship of identity to mass media and culture, and they probably had some laudable influence on the broader culture. They are, however, inadequate to the evolving contexts I have described. One can sum up the most widely circulating theories of social change among “critical social theorists” of the twentieth century in the following, admittedly simplified, statement: There is an (evil) Totality (fill in the blank with one or more: patriarchy, whites, the West, the U.S., neo-liberalism, global capitalism) that must be overturned by a Radical Revolution. We don’t know the shape of what will come after the Revolution, but The Evil is a construction of the Totality, so anything that comes after will be better. All you need is … (fill in the blank: Love, Courage, Violence, etc.). For an example, read Slavoj Žižek’s attack on the evil Totality (“capitalism,” 5 pp. 41/ 49), which requires the “excess” of violence named as “courage” 6 (pp. 75, 78, 79), via “a leap” 7 (p. 81), to eliminate “democracy” for a yet-to-be-imagined “new collectivity” (p. 85).8 The resilience of this social theory identifies it as a rhetorical attractor; a predispositional symbolic set that readily transmits emotive potency. To appropriate Kenneth Burke’s terms, the bio-symbolics of human political relationships readily create a “grammar” and “rhetoric” in the form of a unified enemy that can be imagined as defeated in a singular battle, after which, things in “our” tribe may be harmonious. To identify this fantasy theme in this way is to suggest that it may not merely be the product of “Western” or “capitalist” imaginations, but rather that it arises from an intersection of the structural characteristics of language systems and the nature of human biologies (which readily adopt both tribal social cooperation and inter-tribal competition). Because neither biology nor symbolics are deterministic systems, this fantasy theme is avoidable, even if it is powerfully attractive. Because both biology and symbolics are material, however, specific kinds of work are necessary in order to avoid the lure of that predisposition. This point is crucial, because it invalidates the twentieth century (idealist) approaches to social change, which envisioned a single (violent) leap away from the social as sufficient to create and maintain better worlds. Thus, when Žižek and others urge us to “Act” with violence to destroy the current Reality, without a vision of an alternative, on the grounds that the links between actions and consequences are never certain, we can call ~~his~~ [their] appeal both a failure of imagination and a failure of reality. As for reality, we have dozens of revolutions as models, and the historical record indicates quite clearly that they generally lead not to harmonious cooperation (what I call “AnarchoNiceness” to gently mock the romanticism of Hardt and Negri) but instead to the production of totalitarian states and/or violent factional strife. A materialist constructivist epistemology accounts for this by predicting that it is not possible for symbol-using animals to exist in a symbolic void. All symbolic movement has a trajectory, and if you have not imagined a potentially realizable alternative for that trajectory to take, then what people will leap into is biological predispositions— the first iteration of which is the rule of the strongest primate. Indeed, this is what experience with revolutions has shown to be the most probable outcome of a revolution that is merely against an Evil. The failure of imagination in such rhetorics thereby reveals itself to be critical, so it is worth pondering sources of that failure. The rhetoric of “the kill” in social theory in the past half century has repeatedly reduced to the leap into a void because the symbolized alternative that the context of the twentieth century otherwise predispositionally offers is to the binary opposite of capitalism, i.e., communism. That rhetorical option, however, has been foreclosed by the historical discrediting of the readily imagined forms of communism (e.g., Žižek9 ). The hard work to invent better alternatives is not as dramatically enticing as the story of the kill: such labor is piecemeal, intellectually difficult, requires multi-disciplinary understandings, and perhaps requires more creativity than the typical academic theorist can muster. In the absence of a viable alternative, the appeals to Radical Revolution seem to have been sustained by the emotional zing of the kill, in many cases amped up by the appeal of autonomy and manliness (Žižek uses the former term and deploys the ethos of the latter). But if one does not provide a viable vision that offers a reasonable chance of leaving most people better off than they are now, then Fox News has a better offering (you’ll be free and you’ll get rich!). A revolution posited as a void cannot succeed as a horizon of history, other than as constant local scale violent actions, perhaps connected by shifting networks we call “terrorists.”

#### The alternative is to reclaim humanism — that challenges state authority and allows for effective future building.

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In different ways Césaire and Senghor hoped to fashion a legal and political framework that would recognize the history of interdependence between metropolitan and overseas peoples and protect the latter’s economic and political claims on a metropolitan society their resources and labor had helped to create. Rather than allow France and its former colonies to be reified as independent entities in an external relationship to each other, the task was to institutionalize a long-standing internal relationship that would persist even after a legal separation. They were not simply demanding that overseas peoples be fully integrated within the existing national state but proposing a type of integration that would reconstitute France itself, by quietly exploding the existing national state from within. Legal pluralism, disaggregated sovereignty, and territorial disjuncture would be constitutionally grounded. The presumptive unity of culture, nationality, and citizenship would be ruptured. Given these colonies’ entwined relationship with metropolitan society, decolonization would have to transform all of France, continental and overseas, into a different kind of political formation—specifically, a decentralized democratic federation that would include former colonies as freely associated member states. This would guarantee colonial emancipation and model an alternative global order that would promote civilizational reconciliation and human self-realization. At stake, for them, was the very future of the world.4 Refusing to accept the doxa that self-determination required state sovereignty, their interventions proceeded from the belief that colonial peoples cannot presume to know a priori which political arrangements would best allow them to pursue substantive freedom. Yet this pragmatic orientation was inseparable from a utopian commitment to political imagination and anticipatory politics through which they hoped to transcend the very idea of France, remake the world, and inaugurate a new epoch of human history.5 Their projects were at once strategic and principled, gradualist and revolutionary, realist and visionary, timely and untimely. They pursued the seemingly impossible through small deliberate acts. As if alternative futures were already at hand, they explored the fine line between actual and imagined, seeking to invent sociopolitical forms that did not yet exist for a world that had not yet arrived, although many of the necessary conditions and institutions were already present. This proleptic orientation to political futurity was joined to a parallel concern with historicity. They proclaimed themselves heirs to the legacies of unrealized and seemingly outmoded emancipatory projects. This book may be read in at least two ways. On one level, it is an intellectual history of Aimé Césaire and Léopold Senghor between 1945 and 1960. As such, it extends the account provided in my last book of the genesis of the Negritude project in the 1930s in relation to a new form of colonial governance in French West Africa, the political rationality of postliberal republicanism, and the development of a transnational black public sphere in imperial Paris.6 Freedom Time follows that story into the postwar period, when these student-poets became poet-politicians participating directly in reshaping the contours of Fourth and Fifth Republic France and pursuing innovative projects for self-determination. On another level, it attempts to think through their work about the pro cesses and problems that defined their world and continue to haunt ours. Their writings on African and Antillean decolonization may also be read as reflections on the very prospect of democratic self-management, social justice, and human emancipation; on the relationship between freedom and time; and on the links between politics and aesthetics. They attempted to transcend conventional oppositions between realism and utopianism, materialism and idealism, objectivity and subjectivity, positivism and rationalism, singularity and universality, culture and humanity. The resulting conceptions of poetic knowledge, concrete humanism, rooted universalism, and situated cosmopolitanism now appear remarkably contemporary.7 Their insights, long treated as outmoded, do not only speak to people interested in black critical thought, anticolonialism, decolonization, and French Africa and the Antilles. They also warrant the attention of those on the left now attempting to rethink democracy, solidarity, and pluralism beyond the limitations of methodological nationalism and the impasses of certain currents of postcolonial and post-structural theory. Decolonization beyond Methodological Nationalism Historians have long treated decolonization as a series of dyadic encounters between imperial states and colonized peoples: the former are figured as powerful nations possessing colonial territories, and the latter as not yet independent nations ruled by foreign colonizers. Such stories are often tethered to parallel accounts of nation formation. Whether focused on European powers or Third World peoples, policymakers or social movements, international strategy or political economy, a certain methodological nationalism has persisted in this scholarship. But to presuppose that national independence is the necessary form of colonial emancipation is to mistake a product of decolonization for an optic through which to study it. Rather than evaluate decolonization from the standpoint of supposedly normal national states, this book seeks to historicize the postwar logic that reduced colonial emancipation to national liberation and self-determination to state sovereignty. It does so in part by recognizing that decolonization was an epochal process of global restructuring that unfolded on a vast political terrain inhabited by diverse actors and agencies. The outcome of this process was the system of formally equivalent nation-states around which the postwar order was organized. Historical accounts typically focus on stories of confrontations between national states losing overseas possessions and oppressed nations winning independence. Debates often focus on decolonization’s causes, mechanisms, or outcomes as well as the so-called transfer of power. However important, these discussions tend to treat the meaning of decolonization as self-evident by reducing colonial emancipation to national liberation.8 Underlying such dyadic accounts is the assumption that European states had empires but were not themselves empires. Alternatively, an approach that begins with empire as an optic emphasizes the real, if problematic, ways that colonized peoples were members of imperial political formations. It proceeds from the fact that European states did not simply surrender colonies but abandoned their overseas populations. Decolonization was among other things a deliberate rending whereby populations were separated, polities divided, and communities disenfranchised.9 Rather than focus on the mechanisms, pace, or implementation of national independence for colonized peoples, histories of decolonization should inquire into the range of political forms that were imagined and fashioned during what was a process of economic restructuring and political realignment on a global scale. Historians have recently demonstrated that however important liberation struggles and metropolitan transformations were in the process of decolonization, colonized peoples and European policymakers were not always the primary actors in this drama. Other agents—the United States, the Soviet Union, China, the United Nations, international public opinion—were no less important in dismantling Europe’s empires and creating the neocolonial system that would succeed them.10 Histories that do not start with methodological nationalism can also focus less on who may have helped or hindered programs for state sovereignty than on the various ways that colonial actors confronted freedom as a problem with no intrinsic solution. Public struggles over the shape of the postwar world questioned the meanings of terms long treated as synonyms: freedom, liberty, emancipation, independence, sovereignty, self-determination, and autonomy. This study attends to the historical processes through which these terms came to refer to one another. It does so by engaging seriously Césaire’s and Senghor’s attempts to fashion political forms that were democratic, socialist, and intercontinental. This method fosters an appreciation of the novelty of their attempts to envision new forms of cosmopolitanism, humanism, universalism, and planetary reconciliation, forms that were concrete, rooted, situated, and embodied in lived experiences and refracted through particular but porous lifeworlds. Unthinking France, Working through Empire1 The French Imperial Nation-State was less concerned with the familiar fact that the republican nation-state exercised autocratic rule over colonized peoples than with how imperial history had transformed the republican nation into a plural polity composed of multiple cultural formations, administrative regimes, and legal systems.11 Such multiplicity also enabled novel types of political association, identification, and intervention. The crucial question was not how France behaved overseas or how its populations experienced colonial rule. Rather, it was how the fact of empire, including how colonial subjects reflected upon it, invites us to radically rethink “France” itself. I suggested we follow the lead of the expatriate student poets associated with the Negritude project who since the mid-1930s grappled with the imperial form of the interwar republic. In contrast, Freedom Time explores how French imperialism created conditions for an alternative federal democracy that might have been. Underlying both works is a challenge to the methodological nationalism that often conditions the study of French colonial empire. They proceed from the conviction that historians should not simply turn their research attention to colonial topics; we need to do so in ways that turn inside out the very category “France.”12 Freedom Time again engages the contradiction between France as an actually existing imperial nation-state and the territorial national categories that formed both French self-understanding through the colonial period and historiographic common sense in the postcolonial period. Any attempt to understand the French empire through those same national categories unwittingly reenacts that initial contradiction. But engaging French history from the standpoint of empire invites and compels us to unthink a series of assumptions about the territorial national paradigm concerning the isomorphism among territory, people, and state; the symmetry between nationality and citizenship; the national state as a unitary juridical and administrative space; or the scale and composition of politi cal terrains, public spheres, discursive communities, and intellectual fields. Treating empire as an irreducible unit of analysis and refiguring France as an imperial nation-state confounds conventional distinctions among national, transnational, and international phenomena and recognizes that the challenge of cultural multiplicity for a democratic republic was an imperial problem that did not begin with decolonization and postwar immigration. In many ways the imperial republic was a profoundly cosmopolitan space in which legal pluralism and disaggregated sovereignty were institutionalized in ways that might illuminate current debates over plural democracy in the French postcolony.13 In order to “work through” empire, to treat France as an imperial formation and consider French history from an imperial perspective, we must unthink France as object and unit.14 Here I am borrowing from Immanuel Wallerstein, who calls on scholars to unthink nineteenth-century social scientific categories and paradigms that once enabled but now obstruct understanding of time, space, and development. He distinguishes the act of rethinking an interpretation based on new evidence from the more radical gesture of unthinking the very categories by which we apprehend such evidence.15 The concept of working through has multiple associations. On a common-sense level it suggests careful analysis, coming to terms with a topic by unpacking it. But it also indicates how a perceived topic may also serve as an optic through which to rethink and to unthink. Working through thus signals an operation akin to Marxian immanent critique: identifying elements within an existing formation that point beyond it. Working through is also a psychoanalytic term that suggests a different kind of overcoming, another type of emancipation through critical self-reflexivity: mastering an impasse by confronting and untangling it; moving inside and through it in order to get beyond it. Dominick LaCapra has written about the relationship between historiography and the Freudian concepts of acting out and working through. He warns of the danger of “historical transference,” the tendency among historians to act out in their work the processes about which they are writing. Working through thus also implies a self-reflexive distance from the object rather than an unthinking identification with it.16 Aimé Césaire and Léopold Senghor spent their public lives “working through” empire and “unthinking” France in just these ways. Proceeding from the insight that Africans and Antilleans were integral parts of the (imperial) nation, they refused to accept that “France” referred to a metropolitan entity or a European ethnicity. They rejected the idea that they existed outside radical traditions of “French” politics and thought. Even as student-poets in the 1930s, they did not simply call for political inclusion but made a deeper demand that “France” accommodate itself legally and politically to the interpenetrated and interdependent realities its own imperial practices had produced. Treating imperial conditions as the starting point for emancipatory projects, they claimed France as theirs and thus challenged the unitary and territorialist assumptions upon which the national state had long depended. Though their decolonization projects differed, Césaire and Senghor were more interested in reclaiming and refunctioning than rejecting the categories and forms that mediated their subjection. This recalls Adorno’s insight about the revolutionary efficacy of a “literalness” that “explodes [an object] by taking it more exactly at its word than it does itself,”17 an approach we might call the politics of radical literalism. Césaire and Senghor repeatedly insisted that while they did not feel alienated from French and France, those who assumed that they should—whether on the left or right—needed to revise their own understanding of these categories. Their politics of radical literalism thus linked immanent critique to poetic imagination, aiming less to negate the empire or the republic than to sublate and supersede them. Rather than counterpose autarchic notions of Africa, the Caribbean, or blackness to a one-dimensional figure of France, they claimed within “France” those transformative legacies to which they were rightful heirs and attempted to awaken the self-surpassing potentialities that they saw sedimented within it. Rather than found separate national states, they hoped to elevate the imperial republic into a democratic federation. Without understanding this distinctive orientation to anticolonialism, it is difficult to appreciate the political specificity of Césaire’s and Senghor’s pragmatic-utopian visions of self-determination without state sovereignty. Their radically literalist approach to decolonization cannot be fully grasped without understanding their aesthetic orientation to images as self-surpassing objects. For example, when they invoke “France” in their postwar legislation, criticism, or poetry they are often referring not to the existing national state but to the future federation they hoped to create. Deterritorializing Social Thought Césaire and Senghor were canny readers of their historical conjuncture in relation to the macrohistorical trends of imperial history. Like many of their contemporaries—Third World nationalists, regionalists, panethnicists, and socialist internationalists—they were acutely aware that decolonization would entail the reconfiguration rather than the elimination of imperial domination. But rather than offer a territorial response to this threat, they formulated epochal projections and projects. Their ambition exceeded a commitment to protecting the liberty and improving the lives of the populations they represented. They also felt themselves to be implicated in and responsible for remaking the world and redeeming humanity. Their interventions thus remind us that during the postwar opening, the world-making ambition to reconceptualize and reorganize the global order was not the exclusive preserve of imperial policymakers, American strategists, international lawyers, or Third International Communists. But to even recognize this dimension of anticolonialism requires us to move beyond the dubious but entrenched assumption that during decolonization many in the West thought globally while colonized peoples thought nationally, locally, concretely, or ethnically—and those that didn’t were somehow inauthentic. Scholarship long promoted one-sided understandings of Césaire and Senghor as either essentialist nativists or naive humanists.18 Tied to the territorialism that dominated histories of decolonization, Negritude, whether embraced or criticized, was treated as an affirmative theory of Africanity rather than a critical theory of modernity. Scholars have typically viewed their writings as expressions of black subjectivity or anticolonialism and read their political proposals reductively, seeking information or messages, or in relation to Césaire’s or Senghor’s public records after decolonization. Like The French Imperial Nation-State, this book endorses more recent attempts to understand these figures’ writings as multifaceted engagements with modern politics, philosophy, and critical theory.19 I extend the effort of my earlier book to treat Césaire and Senghor as situated thinkers whose reflections illuminate not only the black French or colonial condition but their own historical epoch and the larger sweep of political modernity by engaging the elemental categories around which political life at various scales was organized. Regarding them as epochal thinkers and would-be world makers who grappled with global problems at a historical turning point raises questions about territorial assumptions underlying strong currents in both European historiography and postcolonial criticism, assumptions that often lead scholars to relate texts to the ethnicity, territory, or formal political unit to which their authors appear to belong or refer. Critics often treat Césaire or Senghor as representatives of black thought or African philosophy whose thinking may have been influenced by French or European ideas but whose writings refer to local lifeworlds that are somehow separate from “the West.”20 But their reflections should be read in relation to contemporaneous attempts, between the 1920s and 1960s, to overcome conventional oppositions between speculative rationalism and positivist empiricism by developing concrete, embodied, lived, intuitive, or aesthetic ways of knowing through which to reconcile subject and object, thought and being, transcendence and worldliness. Their work thus exists within a broad intellectual constellation including not only surrealist modernism or Bergsonian vitalism but ethnological culturalism, Christian personalism, and Marxist humanism (as well as Jewish messianism and philosophical pragmatism).21 They also contributed to the critical engagement with instrumental reason, state capitalism, the reification of everyday life, the domestication of western European socialism, and the limitations of Soviet Communism.22 Yet these thinkers are rarely included in general considerations of interwar philosophy or postwar social theory. This despite their novel attempts to link the search for a concrete metaphysics, poetic knowledge, and lived truth to a postnational political project for colonial and human emancipation that built upon traditions of mutualist socialism, cooperative federalism, and cosmopolitan internationalism. Or their attempts to reformulate humanism and universalism on the basis of concrete historical conditions and embodied experience. The point is not to reduce their thinking to continental or hexagonal parameters nor speciously to elevate or legitimate it by placing it alongside canonical works. It is, rather, to use their work and acts to rethink, or unthink, the supposedly European parameters of modern thought. Just as Césaire and Senghor refused to concede that “France” was an ethnic category or continental entity, they resisted the idea that they should approach modern philosophy as foreigners. So rather than debate whether their writings were African-rooted or European-influenced, we should read them as postwar thinkers of the postwar period, one of whose primary aims was precisely to question the very categories “Africa,” “France,” and “Europe” through an immanent critique of late-imperial politics. They attempted in ways at once rooted and global to grapple with human and planetary problems at a moment of world-historical transition. Understandable fears of totalizing explanation and Eurocentric evaluation have led a generation of scholars to insist on the singularity of black, African, and non-Western forms of thought. But we now need to be less concerned with unmasking universalisms as covert European particularisms than with challenging the assumption that the universal is European property. My aim is not to provincialize Europe but to deprovincialize Africa and the Antilles. Dipesh Chakrabarty’s landmark critique demonstrated that supposedly universal categories were in fact produced within culturally particular European societies.23 Césaire’s and Senghor’s multiplex reflections on Negritude resonate in many ways with Chakrabarty’s argument about the existence of incommensurable forms of being and thinking that are often ungraspable by the rationalist protocols of modern historiography.24 But their thinking also provides a perspective from which to question Chakrabarty’s critique of general, abstract, and universal thought from the standpoint of local, concrete, and particular lifeworlds.25 It reveals how the “provincializing Europe” argument depends partly on a set of territorial assumptions about lifeworlds; how it tends to collapse people, place, and consciousness and to ethnicize forms of life; how it equates the abstract and universal with “Europe” and the concrete and lived with India or Bengal. Chakrabarty argues persuasively that there is an intrinsic connection between forms of life and forms of thought but does not then inquire directly into the scales of lifeworlds in relation to which thinking is often forged. He seems reluctant to recognize that large social formations and political fields, such as empires, are also concrete places. Yet if there exists a determinate relationship between dwelling and thinking and if in certain cases we identify an empire to be the relevant social formation within which lives are lived and consciousness shaped, then that imperial form and scale, rather than a culture or ethnicity, must be relevant for understanding a form of thought. If we begin with empire as our unit of analysis, the case for insisting on cultural singularity or epistemological incommensurability weakens. An imperial optic, for example, may help us to appreciate how postwar Martinique or Senegal really were “European” places and integral parts of “France.” Or that putatively French or European forms of thought were elaborated through the dialogic exchanges, antagonistic confrontations, and transcontinental circulation that characterized life and thought in mid-twentieth-century European empires. It then follows that the supposedly European categories of political modernity belong as much to the African and Antillean actors who coproduced them as to their continental counterparts. These black thinkers also produced important abstract and general propositions about life, humanity, history, and the world. My argument pushes against a recent tendency in comparative history and colonial studies to insist upon multiple, alternative, or countermodernities, thus granting to Europe possession of a modernity which was always already translocal. What is the analytic and political cost of assigning to Europe such categories or experiences as self-determination, emancipation, equality, justice, and freedom, let alone abstraction, humanity, or universality? Why confirm the story that Europe has long told about itself? Modern, concrete universalizing processes (like capitalism) were not confined to Europe. Nor were concepts of universality (or concepts that became universal) simply imposed by Europeans or imitated by non-Europeans. They were elaborated relationally and assumed a range of meanings that crystallized concretely through use. Moreover, African traditions of being and thinking entailed abstract ways of conceptualizing humanity. All humanisms, after all, are rooted in concrete ways of being, thinking, and worlding. Chakrabarty recognizes that the intellectual heritage of Enlightenment thought is now global and that he writes from within this inheritance. He concludes with an eloquent reminder that “provincializing Europe cannot ever be a project of shunning European thought. For at the end of European imperialism, European thought is a gift to us all. We can talk of provincializing it only in an anticolonial spirit of gratitude.”26 So clearly he is not himself a provincial or nativist thinker. Yet this conception of gratitude concedes too much at the outset—to Europe as wealthy benefactor and to a liberal conception of private property. For if modernity was a global process its concepts are a common legacy that already belong to all humanity; they are not Europe’s to give. They are the product of what Susan Buck-Morss has recently called “universal history,” the “gift of the past,” and “communism of the idea.”27 In short, Césaire’s and Senghor’s postwar work invites us to deterritorialize social thought and to decolonize intellectual history. This is not matter of valorizing non-European forms of knowledge but of questioning the presumptive boundaries of “France” or “Europe” themselves—by recognizing the larger scales on which modern social thought was forged and appreciating that colonial societies produced self-reflexive thinkers concerned with large-scale processes and future prospects. The point is not simply that Césaire and Senghor were also interested in humanism, cosmopolitanism, and universalism. More significantly, they attempted to reclaim, rethink, and refunction these categories by overcoming the abstract registers in which they were conventionally formulated and attempted to realize them through intercontinental political formations. Not satisfied with securing a favorable place for their peoples within the existing international order, they sought to transcend it; rather than simply pursue sovereignty, they envisioned unprecedented arrangements for dwelling and thinking through which humanity could realize itself more fully. From the evanescent opening of the postwar moment they anticipated a new era of world history in which human relations would be reorganized on the basis of complementarity, mutuality, and reciprocity. Through these novel political arrangements, humanity might overcome the alienating antinomies that had impoverished the quality of life in overseas colonies and European metropoles.

#### You should be willing to affirm Humanism as a fundamentally African project to start working towards a better future.

Wilder 16 ― Gary Wilder, Associate Professor of Anthropology at the University of New York, Ph.D. in anthropology and history from the University of Chicago, former Fellow at the Mellon Foundation, 2016. (“Here/Hear Now Aimé Césaire!”, The South Atlantic Quarterly, July 2016, Available Online at: <https://www.academia.edu/27869922/Here_Hear_Now_Aim%C3%A9_C%C3%A9saire_South_Atlantic_Quarterly_?auto=download> Accessed 9-8-17)

These key terms illuminate crucial aspects of what made Césaire a distinctive thinker whose critical voice may continue to resonate for us today. But in order to attend to Césaire as he did his predecessors—as a contemporary— we should recognize how his intellectual orientation and insights brush against the grain of many current theoretical tendencies. In both critical theory and postcolonial studies, the standard operation is to unmask purportedly universal categories as socially constructed, culturally particular, and implicated in practices, systems, and logics of domination. These are indispensable critical moves. But this approach often devolves into a hunt for traces of universalism or humanism, whether in textual artifacts or political projects, in order to reveal the regressive or oppressive essence of the object. This “aha” moment thus becomes the punch line of the discussion rather than the starting point for analysis. Such fears of complicity with power do not only belie a longing for intellectual and political purity. They also make it difficult to think dialectically, to identify aspects of given arrangements that may point beyond their actually existing forms. The current insistence on negative critique also makes scholars reluctant to identify desirable alternatives and specify the kind of world they might want to create. But what do we concede if we are unable or unwilling to risk affirming more just, more human, ways of being to which we can say “yes”? It is not easy for radical thinkers to reconcile a nonprescriptive orientation to a radically open future with the imperative to envision more desirable arrangements (Coronil 2011). But ignoring or deferring the challenge does not make it disappear. Following anticolonial thinkers like Césaire, especially those located within the black Atlantic critical tradition, may remind us not to forfeit categories such as freedom, justice, democracy, solidarity, and humanity to the dominant actors who have instrumentalized and degraded them. Given this dilemma, the attention paid to Vivek Chibber’s recent polemic against subaltern studies is not surprising. Such attention, however, seems to be less about the merits of his universalist Marxism than about a sense of some of the limitations and impasses into which certain currents of postcolonial thinking have led (Chibber 2013).7 Partha Chatterjee himself has recently written, “The task, as it now stands, cannot . . . be taken forward within the framework of the concepts and methods mobilized in Subaltern Studies . . . what is needed are new projects” (2012a: 44). He suggests that such projects should probably focus on “cultural history” and “popular culture” with a renewed focus on visual materials and embodied practices rather than written texts and on ethnography rather than intellectual history. Moreover, he links this invitation to study “the ethnographic, the practical, the everyday and the local” to a focus on subnational “regional formations” and “minority cultures” and languages whose specificities, he observes, had not been sufficiently engaged by earlier subaltern studies research on “India,” “Pakistan,” or “Bangladesh” (47–49). Valuable as such studies would surely be, it is not clear how a renewed focus on locality, with place-based assumptions about territory, consciousness, and categories, could do the kind of critical work necessary to grasp the deep shifts in political logics, structures, and practices that characterize the world-historical present. On the contrary, such approaches risk reproducing precisely the culturalist and territorialist assumptions about political identification and affiliation that need to be rethought in light of contemporary conditions.8 Chatterjee’s surprising emphasis on local ethnography seems consistent with one trend in postcolonial thinking that risks reviving the types of civilizational thinking, and associated assumptions about origins and authenticity, that it had earlier set out to dismantle (Chakrabarty 2007; Mah- mood 2005; Mignolo 2011). Consider the important ways that Talal Asad has invited us to rethink liberal assumptions about “tradition,” with respect to liberal and nonliberal forms of life. In dialogue with Ludwig Wittgenstein and Alasdair MacIntyre, Asad (1986) has developed a powerful critique of liberal secularism—and the secularist logic that subtends many modern liberal states—from the standpoint of embodied and discursive traditions. On the one hand, he reminds us that “Islamic tradition” is neither singular nor unchanging; it is a structured and dynamic space for reasoned argument. On the other hand, he reminds us that despite liberalism’s claims to post- traditional neutrality, it too constitutes a particular tradition (albeit one that defines itself in opposition to inherited, embodied, and practice-oriented forms of tradition-based reasoning). Asad’s genealogical insights have rightly informed recent critiques of Western liberal ideologies, states, and politics especially regarding their arrogant, condescending, and violent responses to tradition-rooted practices and practitioners, whether outside or inside the West. But his interventions, however unintentionally, have also led scholars to establish dubious chains of equivalence between modernity, the West, and liberalism. Such operations seem to disregard Asad’s important invitation to understand traditions as capacious, heterogeneous, and dynamic spaces of inquiry, disputation, and revision, not simply as a set of rigid behavioral scripts, unchanging cultural formulas, or dogmatic ideological precepts. This reduction of political modernity to a one-dimensional liberalism obscures, for example, the many currents of progressive antiliberalism within the tradition of modern Western political thought. It fails to recognize the significant number of non-European colonial intellectuals engaged in anti-imperial struggles who were active participants in such “traditions within traditions.” It also disregards the contradictions within and redeemable fragments of even liberal political thinking, fragments that, if realized, might point far beyond, and possibly explode, liberalism itself. To reify modern or Western politics into a static and stereotypical liberalism is to risk practicing an unfortunate form of “Occidentalism” that would reinforce archaic civilizational assumptions about incommensurable and unrelated worlds (and worldviews) and disregard the actual history and open possibilities for practices of cross-cultural solidarity whereby anti-imperial actors outside Europe could enter into dialogue or affiliate with, or even discover ways that they are already situated within, counterhegemonic “Western” political traditions. Critics have rightly mobilized singularity, incommensurability, or untranslatability against liberal attempts to discover an abstract humanity and thereby discount situated and embodied forms of life. But the question is whether we treat incommensurability or untranslatability as an epistemological or political limit or as an always imperfect starting point for practices of dialogue, coordination, affiliation, reciprocity, solidarity. For isn’t the impossibility of full transparency or undifferentiated unity simply the unavoidable condition within which all communication, sociality, and politics must be attempted?9 My point is not to congratulate dissident currents within the West, let alone to recuperate liberalism. It is rather to approach radical and emancipatory politics from a place of not-already-knowing, of not presuming to know a priori which aspects of a tradition are irredeemable, which traditions may become allies or habitations, what the boundaries of (thoroughly plastic) traditions must be. This nondogmatic and experimental orientation to politics, traditions, and concepts is one of the most precious and timely gifts that Césaire may offer to us now. He practiced a concrete cosmopolitan relationship to modern traditions of philosophy, aesthetics, and politics, one that was highly developed by the robust tradition of black Atlantic criticism within which he was firmly rooted along with predecessors (e.g., Toussaint and W. E. B. DuBois), contemporaries (e.g., C. L. R. James, James Baldwin, Suzanne Césaire, Senghor), and descendants (e.g., Fanon, Edouard Glissant, Stuart Hall, Paul Gilroy, Achille Mbembe, David Scott). Understandable concerns about totalizing explanation and Eurocentric evaluation have led a generation of scholars to insist on the incommensurable alterity of non-European forms of thought. But perhaps we should be concerned less exclusively with unmasking universalisms as covert European particularism than with also challenging the assumption that the universal is European property. I read Césaire not in order to provincialize European concepts but to deprovincialize Antillean thinking. Césaire’s critical reworkings remind us that the supposedly European categories of political modernity properly belong as much to the African and Caribbean actors who coproduced them as to the inhabitants of continental Europe. Similarly, African and Caribbean thinkers, no less than their continental counterparts, produced abstract and general propositions about “humanity,” “history,” and “the world.” In contrast to invocations of multiple modernities, Césaire never granted to Europe possession of a modernity or universality or humanity that was always already translocal and fundamentally Caribbean. He never treated self-determination, emancipation, freedom, equality, or justice as essentially European and foreign. Césaire’s intellectual and political interventions radically challenged reductive territorialist approaches to social thought. He refused to concede that “France” was an ethnic or continental entity, that Martinique was not in some real way internal to “French” society and politics, or that he was situated outside of modern critical traditions. Thus his ongoing and unapologetic engagements with Hegel, Marx, Proudhon, Nietzsche, Lautréamont, Rimbaud, Mallarmé, Bergson, Freud, Breton, Frobenius, and Lenin, alongside his many African, Antillean, and African American interlocutors. The sonic blurring between “here” and “hear” in the title of this essay is meant to signal not only the contemporaneity of Césaire’s thought for us here now but the imperative that we open ourselves to his presence and recognize his actuality across the epochal divide by hearing what he actually said. This gesture builds on Walter Benjamin’s insight that every now is a “now of recognizability” whereby “what has been comes together in a flash with the now to form a constellation” through which past epochs become newly legible (1999: 462). I also follow Césaire himself, who engaged in dialogue with predecessors as if they were contemporaries and who addressed future interlocutors directly as if they were already present. Like Benjamin, Césaire practiced a form of radical remembrance that connected outmoded pasts to charged presents. This attention to vital histories was bound up with a poetic politics that identified transformative possibilities dwelling within existing arrangements and a proleptic politics that anticipated seemingly impossible futures by trying to enact them concretely in the here and now. But Césaire can only speak to us now if we listen rather than presume to know what someone like him in his situation must have, or should have, been saying. Until very recently, scholarship on his work has been overdetermined by methodological nationalism (that puzzles over his refusal to pursue state sovereignty), identitarian culturalism (that debates how adequately Césaire expressed Antillean lived experience and whether or not he was an essentialist), and a disciplinary division of labor (that too often splits his poetry, criticism, and politics into separate domains). Generally, Cold War scholarship was shaped by a need to evaluate him in relation to canonical anticolonial nationalists and fit him into a narrative of decolonization-as-national-independence. This has made it difficult to recognize the epochal character, world-making ambition, and global sensibility of his political reflections. Faced with the promise of decolonization, Césaire conjugated concrete acts with political imagination in ways that displaced conventional oppositions between aesthetics and politics, realism and utopia, pragmatism and principle. Such efforts were animated by what I have been calling radical literalism and utopian realism and which he called inflection and poetic knowledge. He regarded freedom as a problem whose institutional solution was not self-evident and could only be situational. His interventions demonstrated the nonnecessary relationship between colonial emancipation, popular sovereignty, and self-determination, on the one hand, and territorial state sovereignty and national liberation, on the other. He pursued cosmopolitan aims concretely through transcultural practices and by attempting to invent new political forms through which to ground plural and postnational democratic arrangements. We should recognize that Césaire formulated a critique not of Western civilization from the standpoint of African or Antillean culture but of modern Western racism, imperialism, and capitalism from the standpoint of Antillean and African historical situations and experiences. More generally, it was a critique of an alienated and alienating modernity from the standpoint of embodied and poetic ways of being, knowing, and relating (to self, others, and world). Above all, Césaire recognized residues of, and resources for, more just, human, and integrated ways of living together within Antillean, African, and European texts, traditions, forms, histories, and conditions. In his view, Antilleans—as culturally particular actors, imperial subjects, New World denizens, moderns, and humans—were their rightful heirs. He was concerned less with defining culturally authentic concepts, spaces, and arrangements for Antilleans (apart from Europe or uncontaminated by modernity) than with overcoming imperialism, in solidarity with other struggling peoples, in order to establish less alienated forms of human life globally. Remembering Césaire’s insistence that modern currents of radicalism were shared legacies and common property may help us to rethink inherited assumptions about the relation between territory, ethnicity, consciousness, and interest (Buck-Morss 2009, 2010). They invite us to deterritorialize social thought and to decolonize intellectual history. This is a matter not of valorizing non-European forms of knowledge, as important as such a move certainly is, but of questioning the presumptive boundaries of “Europe” itself—by recognizing the larger scales on which modern social thought was forged and of appreciating that colonial societies produced self-reflexive thinkers concerned with large-scale processes and future prospects. We can thereby recognize Césaire as a situated postwar thinker of the postwar world, one of whose primary aims was to place into question the very categories “France,” “Europe,” and “the West” by way of an immanent critique of late imperial politics. He envisioned postnational arrangements through which humanity could attempt to overcome the alienating antinomies that had impoverished the quality of life in overseas colonies and European metropoles. His situated humanism and concrete cosmopolitanism should thus be placed in a constellation of modern emancipatory thinking oriented toward worldwide human freedom that included antiracist, anti-imperial, internationalist, and socialist thinkers from a range of traditions: black Atlantic, First Internationalist, global anarchist, Western Marxist, Marxist humanist, Third Worldist.

### 1NR---Butler

#### Their author definitely advocates for technological human enhancement.

Butler, 19 – Philip Butler, Assistant Professor of Theology and Black Posthuman and Artificial Intelligence Systems at the Iliff School of Theology; 2019(“Black Transhuman Liberation Theology,” Bloomsbury Publishing, pp. 137-139, bam)

The scholarship of Black spiritualities and Black (Christian) liberation theology has yet to offer meaningful reflection on the role of technology in the lives of Black people. A deep reflection on the role and potential of technology in the lives of Black folks in the North American context may demonstrate technology’s potential to be the perfect partner for spirituality. In saying this, it means that technology helps to create and cultivate a sustained internal disposition primed for liberating the self toward a collective and physically manifested version of liberation. This project is a theological juxtaposition based on the liberation genre/theme forged through the combination of transhumanism and spirituality. This theology starts from the premise that theological anthropology is the foundation for understanding spirituality’s role in the work of liberation. My goal is to bring attention to current and emergent technological advances in order to imagine what it means to begin utilizing technology’s personally augmenting capabilities to enhance human spiritual experiences. I hope that this exercise will provide a physical foundation for realizing the implications of what it means to spiritually struggle against oppression, concretely. The tangible implications of Black transhuman liberation theology manifest as it melds technology and spirituality in a manner that helps individuals create an internal disposition that points toward liberation, keeping the mind clear and focused in the pursuit of the ultimate liberative goal.

I chose this project for several reasons: (1) to begin the discussion of integrating neurophysiology into the study of Black spirituality in the US context; (2) to reflect on potential practices that combine the power of technology and Black spirituality; (3) to bring to the forefront the thought that participation in the Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) fields by Black folks is crucial to achieving the fullness of that compilation—as a means to direct its potential; and (4) I see the combination of these two realms as key to the materialization of liberation that Black folks seek.

With the current rate of technological expansion, it may sometimes appear that technology’s reach has no end. Technology has seeped into nearly every facet of everyday life, even into the way in which governments function. As prosthetic creatures, human beings, or human animals, have and continue to coevolve alongside the technologies we create.1 In that effect, humans have always been transhuman. Very basically, transhumanism is a cultural and philosophical movement. It asserts that any use of technology to augment human intellectual, physical, or psychological capability makes one transhuman.2 This can be seen in the example of the cave dweller, who utilized rocks and sticks to aid her in hunting, cooking, art, and the creation of fire. It can also be seen in the basic biotechnology inherent within the body itself: the brain, neurons, cells, transmitters, etc. So, from this acknowledgment two questions arise: (1) Have we ever been just human? (2) Are we even human—if we’ve always been transhuman? Because if we are not human, then the guidelines for the way we engage others, the world, and ourselves change dramatically. These questions are important to Black folks because as we move into the future, the complex relationship between governing authorities, ourselves, and technology will have a large impact on the way we are then allowed to—or allow ourselves to—live in the world, which is essentially the way we are free.

#### The aff’s fascination with technology as a method of becoming and transgression is what dissociates the physical pain of technology.

Reeve 12 (Donna, Honorary Research Fellow with the Centre for Disability Research, “Disability and Social Theory New Developments and Directions,” 2012, Chapter 6: Cyborgs, Cripples and iCrip: Reflections on the Contribution of Haraway to Disability Studies, <https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137023001_6>, DOA: 9-19-2019) //Snowball

As part of her critique of the post-structural disabled subject, Erevelles (2001) argues strongly that there is danger in viewing disabled subjects as being able to

seek a pleasurable survival as a border-crosser in the ironic political myth of a cyborgean materiality. (Erevelles, 2001: 97)

While many disabled people do have intimate relationships with technology, guide dogs and ventilators which are necessary to everyday survival, this playful transgressing of boundaries so favoured by Haraway and subsequent theorists neglects the materiality of disablism, in other words, the social practices and cultural beliefs that underpin the disadvantage and exclusion experienced by people with impairments (Thomas, 2007: 13). The ease with which cyborg politics offers a new language and possibilities for marginalised groups risks erasing the actual struggles that many disabled people face for economic survival, especially in the majority world. Here the extreme poverty in some countries is exacerbated by the high numbers of people who become amputees as a result of war and landmines (Yeo and Moore, 2003) – cyborg politics would appear to have little relevance to these disabled people struggling simply to survive.